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Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens

Andrew M. Engelhardt* 

Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA

*Corresponding author. E-mail: andrew_engelhardt@brown.edu

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Abstract

The conventional wisdom is that racial attitudes, by forming through early socialization processes, are causally prior to most things political, including whites' party identifications. Yet a broad literature demonstrates that partisanship can shape mass attitudes. The author argues that this influence extends even to presumptively fundamental predispositions like racial attitudes. The study applies cross-lagged models to panel data from the 1990s and 2000s to demonstrate that whites align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties. The results demonstrate that partisanship has a more pronounced influence in the latter time period, which is consistent with a view that changes in the political context can make partisanship a more likely causal force on other attitudes. Racial concerns not only provide a foundation for political conflict: my results reveal that political processes can increase or decrease racial animus.

Keywords: partisanship; prejudice; racial attitudes; polarization

Race is fundamental to American society and American politics. Racial considerations contributed to the constitution's shape, and subsequently structured party systems (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schickler 2016; Tesler 2016) and influenced policy making (Katznelson 2006). The politicization of race generated by these institutions facilitates the links between the mass public's racial attitudes and their policy preferences (Gilens 1999; Tesler 2016) and party attachments (Tesler 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005) – links that in turn maintain race as an important institutional feature. Intentioned or not, race helps shape who gets what, when and how.

Undergirding all of this is an assumption that racial animus feeds political conflict. I turn this conventional wisdom on its head by arguing that political conflict can shape racial attitudes – people's views and beliefs about groups understood to be racial.¹ Political scientists have failed to examine this possibility, perhaps because racial attitudes are seen as persistent and influential predispositions that form during childhood, long before most Americans become political animals (Sears and Brown 2013).² According to this line of reasoning, individuals use these early-formed attitudes to make sense of politics; racial attitudes lead to partisanship (Green et al. 2002; Sears and Funk 1999; Tesler 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005).³

I contend that consistently viewing the relationship as unidirectional is unwise. Instead, partisanship might also affect racial attitudes. This is theoretically plausible for two reasons. First, partisanship is perhaps the most important attitude in Americans' political belief systems. Scholars have found that partisanship is causally prior to many individual aspects once thought

¹My argument extends findings that partisanship can shape positions on race-related issues (Carsey and Layman 2006; Highton and Kam 2011) to consider attitudes about racial groups.

²Recent reviews of prejudice and politics view early-socialized racial animus as an explanation for political decisions (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder 2013).

³Tesler (2016) suggests that evaluations of Barack Obama changed racial attitudes, but does not provide a full account (215, n. 33).

to be causally prior to partisanship, including issue positions (Lenz 2012), core political values (Goren 2005) and economic evaluations (Bartels 2002). Add to this individuals' motivation to adopt party-consistent views (Bolsen et al. 2014), and a dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes is not only possible, but plausible.

Secondly, because the parties of the early twenty-first century have not changed where they stand on race, party switching on racial attitudes is less likely. People are unlikely to receive information on race that changes which party they believe is more supportive of racial minorities, and fewer people have misaligned partisanship and racial attitudes. Instead, when people receive information on race they are likely to change their attitudes. Party attachments can shape the kinds of information people receive on race and how they interpret it. Party elites, for instance, discuss race in markedly different ways when it becomes salient (Engelhardt *forthcoming*; Haney López 2014; King and Smith 2014), offering one potential source of party-driven attitude change (Zaller 1992).

I demonstrate that partisanship relates to racial attitude change. Using panel data, I compare two different political contexts, the early 1990s and late 2000s. I find that whites' racial attitudes encourage party switching in both periods, but particularly the 1990s. The later period features many more whites aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship than switching parties. The results paint a normatively mixed picture by showing that politics, through partisanship, can perpetuate negative racial attitudes or encourage whites to adopt more favorable views.

Partisanship, Race And Racial Attitude Updating

The connection between race and partisanship in the modern era has grown stronger over at least the last half century (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schickler 2016). Before 1964, intraparty conflicts largely kept civil rights off the national political agenda, with Southern Democrats in particular the keystone to maintaining institutionalized racism. This changed when Democrats championed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts and Republicans courted disaffected whites with their Southern Strategy. In subsequent years, Democrats reinforced their commitment to pro-black policies, while Republicans distanced themselves from racial liberalism (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Ch. 2). In part because the growing partisan divide on race gives elites incentives to use racialized campaign messages (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001), the mass public has received clear signals about where the parties stand on issues related to race since at least the mid-1960s.

Changes in the mass public's party loyalties followed this information about where the parties stand, and explanations of these changes contribute to the prevailing characterization of the relationship as one in which racial attitudes shape individuals' partisanship. For Sears and Funk (1999), racial attitudes played a 'unique role' in shaping 'partisan political preferences during the civil rights era and its aftermath' (17) (see also Valentino and Sears 2005). Similarly, Green et al. (2002) contend that the enfranchisement of African Americans changed each party's 'social imagery', motivating whites to switch parties. Tesler (2016) echoes this claim when arguing that Barack Obama's presidency motivated racial liberals and conservatives to become Democrats and Republicans.

The conventional wisdom on whites' racial attitudes also argues that race leads to party. Prior studies contend that racial attitudes form early in life and persist through most of adulthood as a way to understand the world (Goldman and Hopkins *forthcoming*; Henry and Sears 2009; Sears and Brown 2013). The available evidence indicates that children understand racial categories before kindergarten and come to see them as fixed attributes as they grow up (Hirschfeld 1996). People's early social environments, including family and school experiences, contribute morals and values that give these categories meaning (Goldman and Hopkins *forthcoming*).

The evidence of early-acquired racial attitudes encourages scholars to treat them as causally prior to political outcomes including partisanship (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Sears and Funk 1999; Tesler 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005), implicitly reinforcing the conventional view that these attitudes are unlikely outcomes of political processes. The position holds that

when people encounter information on race, they will align some political position with their racial attitudes rather than change the latter. However, I propose that the contexts people find themselves in can motivate racial attitude change. People can re-evaluate racial groups by incorporating additional information, like that provided by political elites when they draw attention to the positive and negative characteristics that define racial categories (Engelhardt *forthcoming*; Haney López 2014; King and Smith 2014).

Changes in which racial attitudes count as socially acceptable offer some initial guidance. For decades, white Americans believed that whites and blacks were innately different. This biological racism persisted among elites at least until World War II when it lost favor among social scientists (Kinder and Sanders 1996, Ch. 5). Changes in elites' beliefs precipitated a change in the mass public such that biological racism is decidedly uncommon these days (but see Tesler 2016). As Kinder and Sanders (1996) detail, how elites talk about race affects how individuals express their attitudes. I extend this thinking to argue that elites, and the information environment more generally, can affect how people express distinct racial attitudes as well as which attitudes they hold.

Why Partisanship Should Matter For Racial Attitudes

To see how partisanship could shape racial attitudes, consider the relationship between the two in terms of attitude centrality. Partisanship is more likely to change orientations that are less important to individuals (Converse 1964). Although racial attitudes are thought to be more central than partisanship, and therefore the more likely causal force, at times even presumptively fundamental orientations may change to align with partisan loyalties (Bartels 2002; Goren 2005; Lenz 2012). Recent evidence, for instance, suggests that people's party loyalties affect religious affiliations (Margolis 2018) – group orientations thought to contribute to partisan preferences – and that this influence could extend to attitudes about social groups. This is plausible because partisan attachments are so ingrained, they even shape responses to reaction time tasks (Theodoridis 2017) and shape preferences in non-political settings (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Engelhardt and Utych 2018). Partisanship's importance, and evidence that it can influence presumptively fundamental orientations, together suggest it may facilitate racial attitude change.

Partisanship's influence can be seen through several potential mechanisms. It shapes which sources of information people pay attention to and how they process the information they receive. People generally prefer relatively costless information searches, and therefore tend to rely on co-partisan information sources because they value credible and trustworthy messengers (Zaller 1992). Alongside potential differences in information exposure, partisanship's function as a 'perceptual screen' encourages biased information processing (Bartels 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Gaines et al. 2007), leading people to hold consistent attitudes (Bolsen et al. 2014). People interpret social and political affairs in ways that fit with their partisanship and modify their attitudes accordingly.

Party-biased reactions to the information environment should most affect whites. Racially segregated geographic and social spaces limit whites' interactions with non-coethnics (Cox et al. 2016; Logan and Stults 2011). Whites' information about non-whites may primarily, or solely, come from political elites and other sources (Entman and Rojecki 2000).

Social psychology offers insights into how whites' attitudes may respond to information on race. Signs of racial progress can motivate some whites to bolster the existing racial hierarchy and hold more negative racial attitudes (Norton and Sommers 2011; Wilkins and Kaiser 2014). Cues about whether race merits attention can have similar attitudinal consequences. Those emphasizing a colorblind perspective, by proposing that people should ignore race in decision making, can lead some whites to avoid acknowledging their own racial biases (Richeson and Nussbaum 2004) and become less likely to see racism as an explanation for social outcomes (Apfelbaum et al. 2010). Whites thus increasingly de-emphasize race's social reality and deny racial inequality, hallmarks of negative racial attitudes (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tarman and

Sears 2005). But this reverses if people hear rhetoric about racial diversity's benefits or continued discrimination (Apfelbaum et al. 2010; Richeson and Nussbaum 2004).

The information environment could therefore influence attitudes directly or indirectly. First, it may directly shape attitudes by providing information related to race. Secondly, it may shape the perspectives people use to interpret potentially race-related affairs, which in turn influence how information from other sources is processed and thus change views indirectly (Krosnick 1988). Partisanship matters to the degree it affects each potential channel of influence. The evidence indicates that Republican elites typically provide information potentially bolstering negative attitudes and Democratic elites frequently offer perspectives promoting positive views (Engelhardt *forthcoming*; Haney López 2014; King and Smith 2014), which suggests information environments on race that likely differ by party, making party-driven attitude change possible (Zaller 1992).

I examine two explanations of the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. The first – the racial attitude influence hypothesis – follows the conventional wisdom that whites' racial attitudes produce changes in partisanship. Whites' racial attitudes in part foster concerns about who the parties support, leading them to change parties or how strongly they identify with their current one. The second – the partisanship influence hypothesis – argues that parties shape racial attitudes. Partisanship changes attitudes by affecting where people get their information from and how they process what they acquire. These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and can jointly describe the link between partisanship and racial attitudes in a given political context. What can vary is which predisposition drives dynamics.

To assess dynamics, I test these hypotheses in two periods: the Clinton era of the early 1990s and the Obama era of the late 2000s. In the first, the parties are still competing over whites who are cross-pressured by their partisan ties and racial attitudes (Hillygus and Shields 2008).⁴ Whites resolve this conflict by sorting into the 'correct' political party. I therefore expect to find more support for the racial attitude influence hypothesis during this period. In the second era, the political landscape has changed and there are fewer whites with misaligned partisanship and racial attitudes to switch parties. I thus expect to find more support for the partisanship influence hypothesis here.

Importantly, my argument for this latter period does not emphasize unique reactions to President Obama and his administration or responses to a diversifying country; rather, it is more about the general context.⁵ For instance, imagine Obama running and governing in the 1980s when partisanship is in greater flux (Green et al. 2002; Hillygus and Shields 2008). His presence would likely not coincide with much, if any, attitude change. Instead, by reinforcing the connection between the Democratic Party and black America it would likely encourage party switching. Indeed, analyses exploring Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination reflect this possibility. His candidacy coincided with a white electorate shifting its allegiances to the Republican Party, changes motivated in part by racial attitudes (Sears et al. 1987). The latter era matters because it is a different political context. While I cannot conclusively demonstrate that changes in context matter, I present evidence that is consistent with a view that changes in context make it more likely that partisanship shapes other orientations (Highton and Kam 2011).

Data And Methods

I test the relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes using panel data from the American National Elections Studies (ANES), the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project

⁴Green et al. (2002) note partisan attachments in the 1990s were less stable even than prior decades.

⁵Some argue that Obama may also matter by shaping the relationship between racial attitudes and party (Tesler 2016). Specifically, people's evaluations of Obama mediate these interconnections. But other mediators may matter or other factors may produce these results. I do not claim evaluations do not matter, but that they may do so because of, or alongside, other factors. In Appendix H I develop this point further, including related analyses.

(CCAP) and the Democracy Fund.⁶ In Appendix B I show descriptively that the relationship between the two may be changing using the 1986–2016 ANES cross-sections.

I measure racial attitudes in multiple ways. Racial resentment serves as my primary measure (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tarman and Sears 2005) and I complement this with group affect. Racial resentment captures structural versus individual explanations for black Americans' social and economic status (Kam and Burge 2018; Tarman and Sears 2005). It provides a reliable, validated construct consistently used in studies examining the relationship between whites' racial attitudes and partisanship (Tesler 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005). By also including affect I speak to racial animus's multi-dimensional nature (Kinder 2013) and address any concerns with the racial resentment construct (Huddy and Feldman 2009; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Finally, I offer evidence in Appendix I that stereotype measures show similar dynamics.

I operationalize *Racial Resentment* using four items in the Kinder and Sanders (1996) battery.⁷ I sum the items and scale them from 0–1, with higher values indicating greater racial resentment. For *Group Affect* I create a differential affect measure by subtracting how negatively whites feel about whites from how negatively they feel about blacks. I set this to run 0–1, with higher values indicating respondents feel more negatively about blacks than whites.⁸ This procedure accounts for interpersonal differences in how people respond to such items (Brady 1985). I operationalize *Partisanship* using the branched ANES party identification question, present in all data collections. I also set it to run 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican).⁹ In Appendix J I complement this operationalization and use differenced feeling thermometers to measure partisanship; the results show similar attitude change patterns.

Consistent with the existing literature, I focus on non-Hispanic whites (Tesler 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005). Furthermore, when using the 1992–1994 ANES data I restrict the analyses to those consistently interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer across waves (for example, white in 1992 and white in 1994). This holds constant potential variation in responses to the racial resentment items the interview context creates (Kinder and Sanders 1996).¹⁰

I use cross-lagged regression models to evaluate dynamics (Finkel 1995). These assess the effect of lagged racial attitudes ($racial\ attitudes_{t-1}$) on current partisanship (PID_t) and the effect of lagged partisanship (PID_{t-1}) on current racial attitudes ($racial\ attitudes_t$), after accounting for a lagged dependent variable. Equations 1 and 2 show this mathematically:

$$racial\ attitudes_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 racial\ attitudes_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$PID_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 racial\ attitudes_{i,t-1} + v_i \quad (2)$$

⁶I use the 1992–1994 wave of the 1992–1994–1996 ANES panel, the 2008, 2012 and 2016 CCAP election panels, and the 2012–2016 Democracy Fund VOTER Survey (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017). The 1992–1994 ANES panel conducted face-to-face interviews, while the CCAP and VOTER surveys were completed online. Although survey modes differ, this should not affect my analyses because I look at individual-level change. CCAP and VOTER survey participants came from YouGov's non-random respondent pool with completed surveys then weighted back to population benchmarks. Analyses using more panels spanning different parts of the Obama-era 2000s are in Appendix G.

⁷Answers are recorded on five-point strongly agree – strongly disagree scales. The 2016 CCAP differs from the others because it included only three of the four items. Using only the three items common across surveys does not change the substantive results. Full question wording and descriptive statistics appear in Appendix A.

⁸This measure is available in the 1992–1994 ANES, 2012–2016 VOTER survey, and 2016 CCAP. The first two data collections feature 101-point feeling thermometers while the third has five-point favorability scales.

⁹Using such a reliable measure for partisanship may privilege it in analyses using less reliable racial attitude measures. But racial resentment has similar characteristics, with error-corrected stabilities similar to partisanship (Green et al. 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Alternatively, using a single partisanship item may disadvantage it. I address this in additional analyses. In Appendix E I report the results from structural equation models. In Appendix J I measure partisanship with party feeling thermometers. The substantive results persist.

¹⁰Removing this restriction does not change the results.

This method allows me to assess whether change in a variable over time can be attributed to the other variable in the relationship.¹¹ Here, β_1 and α_2 reflect how much lagged partisanship and racial attitudes correlate with current values of the other construct after accounting for individuals' initial scores and associated weights β_2 and α_1 (which provide estimates of each predisposition's temporal stability). If $\beta_1 > 0$, then the partisanship influence hypothesis receives support: whites' racial attitudes are aligned with their partisanship. Similarly, if $\alpha_2 > 0$, then the racial attitude influence hypothesis receives support: whites' partisan ties shift to match their racial attitudes. Finally, while my argument concerns each predisposition's potential impact, the models can also offer suggestive evidence regarding which predisposition drives the dynamics. If $\beta_1 > \alpha_2$, then this suggests partisanship and attitude change matter more. But if $\beta_1 < \alpha_2$, then this suggests racial attitudes and sorting matter more. I estimate the models using seemingly unrelated regressions to facilitate these final comparisons, and report consistent results from additional estimation and analysis strategies in the appendix.¹²

As *prima facie* evidence that whites' partisanship could change racial attitudes, consider the two-wave correlations for partisanship and racial resentment in each dataset. In all cases partisanship's correlation across waves is heartier, and this increases over time. The correlation for racial resentment is 0.67 in the 1992–1994 ANES, 0.80 in the 2008 CCAP, 0.83 and 0.85 in the March and August waves of the 2012 CCAP, 0.80 in the 2012–2016 VOTER survey, and 0.87 in the 2016 CCAP. The correlations for partisanship are 0.81, 0.93, 0.94, 0.94, 0.90 and 0.95, respectively. Partisanship's greater stability, despite measuring it with a single item, suggests it is a likelier cause in these data (Converse 1964; Krosnick 1988).

Results

Racial Attitudes Matter More in the 1990s

I begin with the 1992–1994 ANES panel. These data shed light on the relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes in a context similar to those used as evidence underpinning the conventional wisdom on the relationship. Given prior work I expect to find more support for the racial attitude influence hypothesis ($\alpha_2 > 0$) than the partisanship influence hypothesis ($\beta_1 > 0$). Further, racial attitudes should be more substantively influential than partisanship.

Table 1 contains the results from applying cross-lagged models to these data, separated by racial attitude operationalization. The first column tests the partisanship influence hypothesis and the second column considers the racial attitude influence hypothesis. The results in Column 1 suggest partisanship's relevance in this relationship. Strong partisans, 26 per cent of the sample, separate by an average of 0.041 points on the racial resentment scale in these two years, equivalent to about two-thirds of a category on an item. But these results are imprecisely estimated ($p = 0.054$). Racial resentment's estimated stability is also noteworthy. The results suggest less stability than might be expected for a predisposition consistently placed near the beginning of the causal chain ($\hat{\beta}_2 = 0.600$). Partisanship's positive, albeit modest and imprecisely estimated, influence offers initial suggestive evidence to support the partisanship influence hypothesis.

The results in Column 2 support the racial attitude influence hypothesis. As expected, racial resentment has a significant influence on later party loyalties ($p < 0.05$). The difference in

¹¹Scholars have used this approach to examine partisanship's relationship with core political values (Goren, 2005) and issue orientations (Carsey and Layman 2006; Highton and Kam 2011).

¹²In Appendix D I standardize the variables in Equations 1 and 2 to place them on the same metric, addressing distributional differences between partisanship and racial attitudes. Appendix E offers consistent results from cross-lagged structural equation models that address measurement error concerns. The results in Appendix L suggest the patterns I find are not limited to modeling assumptions, and manifest when considering the distribution of cases demonstrating stability and change in each predisposition over time.

Table 1. Relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes (1992–1994 ANES)

	Racial resentment			Affect difference		
	Racial attitudes _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial attitudes _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.041 (0.021)	0.853* (0.025)	-0.086 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.868* (0.025)	-0.059 (0.082)
Racial attitudes _{t-1}	0.600* (0.031)	0.127* (0.041)		0.586* (0.065)	0.058 (0.082)	
Constant	0.243* (0.022)	0.011 (0.025)		0.229* (0.033)	0.051* (0.047)	
Observations	592	592		577	577	
R ²	0.424	0.656		0.294	0.648	
Residual std. error	0.158	0.205		0.088	0.208	

partisanship for the 7 per cent of the sample scoring at the poles of racial resentment increases by 0.127 points, about three-fourths of a category on the seven-point measure. Combined, the construct stabilities and cross-lagged effects presented in Columns 1 and 2 explain about 33 per cent of the relationship between each predisposition in 1994. The remaining variation comes from other unidentified factors and causal processes (Finkel 1995).¹³

The seemingly unrelated regression estimation strategy also offers a way to test whether racial attitudes or partisanship are more substantively important. Comparing the effects of min-max changes for each predisposition offers insight into its theoretical possible effect, despite different operationalizations (Achen 1982). Column 3 in Table 1 provides the difference in coefficient estimates for partisanship_{t-1} in Column 1 (β_1 in Equation 1) and racial resentment_{t-1} in Column 2 (α_2 in Equation 2), and this difference's precision. As expected, partisanship is less influential than racial resentment ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.086$, $p = 0.03$, one tailed). Racial attitudes thus appear to contribute more substantively to the relationship's dynamics. Even so, these comparisons of theoretical influence are affected by each predisposition's variance because the changes relate to vastly different percentages of the sample. Although racial resentment's theoretical impact far surpasses that of partisanship, this potential influence is overstated because relatively few people occupy the scale endpoints. Another test of substantive influence consists of standardizing all variables to place them on the same metric, thereby directly relating variation in the predictor to variation in the outcome (Achen 1982). Analyses in Appendix D using standardized variables point to racial attitudes as more substantively influential in this regard.

The remaining columns in Table 1 extend these analyses to group affect.¹⁴ The results in Columns 4 and 5 suggest that there is no apparent relationship between differential group affect and partisanship in the 1990s. In neither case does the lagged measure produce significant changes in the other variable. If anything, the results suggest sorting on racial attitudes.¹⁵

These analyses offer two important findings. First, they show that at least one dimension of racial attitudes continued to shape party loyalties into the 1990s. Secondly, they offer suggestive evidence that partisanship may shape racial attitudes, although this only fits with the racial resentment operationalization.

¹³The 33 per cent comes from the proportion of the correlation between partisanship and racial resentment in 1994 unaccounted for by the correlation between the models' residuals. To address potentially unaccounted for factors, analyses in Appendix F include economic orientations, culture war attitudes and anti-immigration attitudes. The substantive conclusions change little.

¹⁴Descriptives: mean₉₂ = 0.55, s.d.₉₂ = 0.10; mean₉₄ = 0.55, s.d.₉₄ = 0.10.

¹⁵Affect and partisanship are uncorrelated in these data. Nor does this relationship vary when looking at group affect separately.

Party Matters More in the 2000s

I use the 2008 and 2012 CCAP surveys and the 2012–2016 VOTER survey to assess dynamics in a different political context. I expect to find consistent support for the partisanship influence hypothesis ($\beta_1 > 0$). Secondly, and in contrast to the preceding analyses, I also expect partisanship to be more substantively influential than racial attitudes given changes in context.

I begin with the 2008 CCAP, using the March and October waves and present the results in Columns 1–3 of [Table 2](#). The first column supports the partisanship influence hypothesis. White strong partisans, over 40 per cent of the sample, separate by an average of 0.102 points in racial resentment ($p < 0.05$), about one and a half categories on a scale item. The racial attitude influence hypothesis also receives support. The difference in partisanship between the least and most racially resentful (about 16 per cent of whites) increases by an average of 0.048 points, over one-fourth a category on the seven-point item.

Partisanship also appears more substantively influential.¹⁶ Column 3, which presents the difference in coefficient estimates, shows that partisanship's influence is reliably greater ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.054, p < 0.05$). Moreover, the effect of moving across partisanship's range implicates a much larger proportion of people than that related to the estimated theoretical influence of racial attitudes. Attitude change appears to better explain the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes than party switching in these data.¹⁷

The remaining columns of [Table 2](#) consider dynamics in 2012. Each week during the campaign a representative sample of the nearly 45,000 respondents who completed the December 2011 CCAP baseline survey were re-interviewed. I focus on the two waves reassessing racial resentment, one in March and the other in August.

The results again support the partisanship influence hypothesis. Column 4 shows that between December and March, the roughly 35 per cent of the white sample who identified as strong partisans separates by an average of 0.074 points on racial resentment ($p < 0.05$). Partisanship also matters for the August group. As the results in Column 7 indicate, strong partisans divide by 0.130 points on racial resentment, over two categories on a scale item ($p < 0.05$).

The results inconsistently support the racial attitude influence hypothesis. Column 5 indicates that the 14 per cent of whites in the March re-interview group placing at the extremes of the racial resentment scale separate by an average of 0.066 points on the partisanship item ($p < 0.05$), two-fifths of a category on the seven-point measure. This effect halves for the August re-interview group. The gap in partisan attachments grows by only 0.032 points, an insignificant difference ($p > 0.10$).

Further, partisanship again appears to be more substantively influential. Its influence on racial attitudes is greater in both waves, albeit only reliably so for the August re-interview group. In addition, in both waves partisanship's influence concerns a group 2.5 times that implicated by a maximal change in racial resentment. Racial resentment's substantive effect is thus, if anything, overstated and the difference in magnitudes indicates a restrictive characterization. Analyses in Appendix D using standardized measures complement this. As with the 2008 analyses, partisanship shapes racial attitudes in this context; but attitude change, not sorting, appears to better characterize dynamics.

But these results only address election year patterns. Although helpful for unpacking attitude change dynamics, particularly for those made salient (Valentino and Sears 1998), a campaign context does not shed light on whether the partisanship influence hypothesis holds over longer periods of time. The results in [Table 3](#) from the 2012–2016 VOTER survey help address this issue. And analyses in Appendix G using data from General Social Survey panels and the 2010–2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study reveal that the dynamics I identify are not merely a

¹⁶Additional analyses in Appendix C also indicate that partisanship's effect reliably differs from the 1990s.

¹⁷The model accounts for about 85 per cent of the relationship between the two predispositions in October.

Table 2. Relationship between whites' partisanship and racial resentment in the 2008 and 2012 elections

	CCAP 2008			CCAP 2012: March			CCAP 2012: August		
	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.102* (0.006)	0.917* (0.006)	0.054* (0.011)	0.075* (0.029)	0.922* (0.021)	0.009 (0.039)	0.130* (0.030)	0.935* (0.018)	0.097* (0.041)
Racial resentment _{t-1}	0.739* (0.009)	0.048* (0.008)		0.812* (0.028)	0.066* (0.027)		0.792* (0.047)	0.032 (0.025)	
Constant	0.120* (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)		0.096* (0.017)	-0.003 (0.014)		0.081* (0.025)	0.012 (0.019)	
Observations	8,866	8,866		726	726		751	751	
R ²	0.660	0.865		0.680	0.885		0.663	0.864	
Residual std. error	0.152	0.138		0.150	0.117		0.149	0.123	

Table 3. Relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes (2012–2016 VOTER survey)

	Racial resentment			Affect difference		
	Racial attitudes _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial attitudes _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.146* (0.017)	0.792* (0.020)	0.005 (0.033)	0.067* (0.009)	0.832* (0.018)	-0.044 (0.049)
Racial attitudes _{t-1}	0.838* (0.024)	0.142* (0.027)		0.563* (0.036)	0.112* (0.049)	
Constant	0.001 (0.014)	0.036* (0.018)		0.185* (0.021)	0.043 (0.030)	
Observations	6,106	6,106		5,796	5,796	
R ²	0.614	0.683		0.317	0.689	
Residual std. error	0.190	0.202		0.113	0.201	

function of surveys conducted during presidential elections. Midterm election year surveys fielded in this period show similar patterns.

The evidence in Table 3 again supports the partisanship influence hypothesis. Strong partisans (40 per cent of whites) separate by an average of 0.146 points in racial resentment ($p < 0.05$). This is equivalent to three and a half categories on a single scale item.

Racial attitudes also contribute to the relationship's dynamics. Those scoring at racial resentment's poles divide by an average of 0.142 points on partisanship, or one response category ($p < 0.05$).

Considering substantive importance, the test comparing the difference in estimated effects offers inconclusive evidence of whether attitude change or sorting drive the dynamics I observe. Column 3 reveals an estimated difference of near 0. But again, this is a comparison of theoretical differences across each measure's range. Racial resentment's effect is likely overstated because relatively few whites (13 per cent) populate the scale endpoints, a possibility reinforced by results from standardizing each measure that suggests partisanship matters more. While the evidence indicates that partisanship's influence can extend beyond campaign contexts, it is mixed as to whether partisanship is more substantively important between 2012 and 2016.¹⁸

The VOTER survey also allows for assessing partisanship's influence using the group affect dimension of racial animus.¹⁹ The results in Column 4 indicate that partisanship's influence persists. Partisanship shapes how much more negatively whites feel about blacks relative to whites ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.067$, $p < 0.05$). Partisanship's influence is not confined to a measure that some contend contains racial policy content (Huddy and Feldman 2009; Sniderman and Carmines 1997), making its influence all the more consequential. This is not simply another story of partisans adopting their party's policy positions (Lenz 2012), but rather one about whites updating their views about a marginalized group in society.

Affect also relates to changing party loyalties. Whites who rate blacks more negatively than whites identify as more Republican ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.130$, $p < 0.05$). These results do not support, however, the result that partisanship matters more when comparing theoretically possible changes ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.042$, $p > 0.1$). But again, the estimated effect for racial attitudes on partisanship is overstated because respondents are not distributed similarly across the measure. Results reported in Appendix D standardizing the variables to adjust for this suggest partisanship has more substantive influence. As with racial resentment, attitude change is thus at least as likely as sorting to explain the growing correlation between racial attitudes and party loyalties, and potentially more so given that the estimated attitude change effect implicates many more respondents.²⁰

¹⁸The model accounts for about two-thirds of the correlation between whites' partisan ties and racial attitudes in 2016.

¹⁹Descriptives: mean₁₂ = 0.56, s.d.₁₂ = 0.11; mean₁₆ = 0.53, s.d.₁₆ = 0.13.

²⁰Looking separately at evaluations of blacks and whites does not yield different insights. Results in Appendix I.

These results provide substantial evidence to support my argument that partisanship can shape racial attitudes. In the Obama era whites adopted racial views consistent with their party loyalties, and this holds for multiple dimensions of racial animus; partisans are not simply following on racial policy attitudes.²¹ While less clear, the evidence also suggests that attitude change rather than sorting does more to explain the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes.

2016: Sustained Party Influence

As a final test I examine whether these results are unique to President Obama. My argument is not simply about reactions to his administration. While the available panel data do not allow us to conclusively rule out any influence from Obama, I consider a period during which he was a less central political actor – the 2016 presidential election. The election featured Donald Trump, a politician more open than most to denigrating racial and ethnic minorities. Trump's actions, and the media coverage they received, provide considerations on race separate from Obama that whites could respond to by changing their attitudes or partisanship. Similarly, Hillary Clinton's strategy of attacking Trump more than advancing her own platform suggests considerations about Trump and his rhetoric were more plentiful, even if Clinton's platform consisted in large part of strengthening Obama's legacy on race-related issues (Sides et al. 2018). But Trump's ascendance also revealed a fracturing Republican Party. Democrats displayed similar divides, with Bernie Sanders challenging Clinton by appealing to economic dissatisfaction. Therefore during this period there are two possibilities: partisanship could still matter (that is, whites' partisanship could shape their racial attitudes) or other topics could matter more (that is, partisanship no longer changes racial attitudes).

For this test I use data from the 2016 CCAP's June and November–December interviews. The results, included in Table 4, again support both hypotheses. The first column indicates that strong partisans, nearly 42 per cent of whites, separate by an average of 0.089 points in racial resentment, a difference of one scale item category on this three-item version ($p < 0.05$).

That is not to say that whites did not also adopt new partisan allegiances. Column 2 suggests that racial attitudes encouraged changes in partisanship. The 20 per cent of the white sample located at the extremes of the racial resentment measure moves apart by 0.034 points on partisanship, or about one-fifth of an item category ($p < 0.05$).

The results also suggest that partisanship has greater substantive influence than racial resentment. Column 3 shows that the difference between partisanship and racial resentment is positive and significant ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.055, p < 0.05$). This occurs despite racial resentment's effect being somewhat overstated because it still implicates fewer people than the same shift for partisanship.²²

The partisanship and racial attitude influence hypotheses also receive support when considering group affect. Here, respondents rated blacks and whites on five-point favorability scales rather than feeling thermometers as in the prior affect analyses.²³ Table 4's remaining results show that partisanship changes affect ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.074, p < 0.05$), and that affect relates to changing party loyalties ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.065, p < 0.05$). These estimates offer no clear insight into substantive influence ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.009, p > 0.10$). But as with the VOTER survey results, racial attitudes' influence is likely overstated because few whites score at the measure's extremes. The dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes again manifests on a measure that contains no policy content, reinforcing the view that whites are updating their attitudes about a social group rather than merely adopting new policy positions.²⁴

²¹In all cases partisanship matters more in analyses standardizing all variables, and shapes racial attitudes after incorporating additional core attitudes. Analyses in Appendices D and F.

²²Party still matters after including additional core predispositions. Analyses in Appendix F.

²³Descriptives: $\text{mean}_{\text{June}} = 0.55, \text{s.d.}_{\text{June}} = 0.17; \text{mean}_{\text{Nov-Dec}} = 0.53, \text{s.d.}_{\text{Nov-Dec}} = 0.18$.

²⁴Looking separately at evaluations of blacks and whites does not yield different insights. Results in Appendix I.

Table 4. Relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes (2016 CCAP)

	Racial resentment			Affect difference		
	Racial attitudes _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial attitudes _t	Partisanship _t	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.089* (0.010)	0.918* (0.009)	0.055* (0.014)	0.074* (0.008)	0.924* (0.008)	0.009 (0.019)
Racial attitudes _{t-1}	0.792* (0.011)	0.034* (0.010)		0.556* (0.022)	0.065* (0.017)	
Constant	0.069* (0.006)	0.026* (0.006)		0.193* (0.011)	0.007* (0.009)	
Observations	8,116	8,116		8,120	8,120	
R ²	0.725	0.851		0.378	0.851	
Residual std. error	0.151	0.128		0.135	0.128	

That racial attitudes still align with partisanship even when Barack Obama is a less focal political actor suggests the dynamic relationship does not depend solely on him. Partisanship's relevance persists in a racialized electoral campaign created in part by the rhetoric from both major party candidates (Sides et al. 2018). Further, the evidence again suggests that the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes likely comes more from attitude change than sorting.

Discussion

To synthesize these results, in this section I present each predisposition's relative effect across data collections. Figure 1 provides the estimated change in the outcome for a one-standard-deviation shift in the lagged predictor (β_1 or α_2). This speaks to substantive effects by focusing on the most likely source of variation in the explanatory variable.

Figure 1 reinforces the insights from the preceding analyses that each predisposition's substantive primacy varies. While racial attitudes are more influential in one case, with an effect twice that of partisanship, partisanship is more influential in the rest – from 1.5 to nearly 6 times so – and this difference is reliable in three of five instances. Not only is the relationship dynamic, but partisanship has been a particularly potent force in recent years.

Partisan Lenses for All? Awareness Moderates Dynamics

While the evidence I provide indicates partisanship can shape whites' racial attitudes, I estimate an average effect throughout. Scholarship investigating the dynamics between issue orientations and partisanship suggests individual-level characteristics may condition such dynamics (Carsey and Layman 2006). To address these complexities and offer evidence to support my argument that partisans are likely responding to features in the information environment, I briefly consider whether political awareness conditions dynamics. Awareness captures individual differences in whether people encounter information and can incorporate what they hear into their existing attitudes (Zaller 1992). If partisans are responding to the information environment as I claim, then the most politically aware should change the most.

I focus on the 1992–1994 ANES and the 2012–2016 VOTER survey. I use the same model specification but generate separate estimates for high- and low-awareness individuals who I define, respectively, as scoring at and above, or below, the median political awareness score in each dataset.²⁵ Table 5 presents the results. The first two columns offer no evidence of a dynamic relationship between racial resentment and partisanship for low-awareness whites in the 1990s.

²⁵I operationalize awareness by summing together correct responses to political fact items and scale this from 0 (low political awareness) to 1 (high political awareness) (Zaller 1992). Median_{ANES1992} = 0.50. Median_{VOTER2012} = 0.90.




Figure 1. Change in present racial resentment (partisanship) produced by a standard deviation shift in lagged partisanship (racial resentment)

Estimated effect, Lagged partisanship, Lagged racial resentment

Note: figure denotes 84 per cent (thicker) and 95 per cent (thinner) confidence intervals. Results from models in Tables 1-4.

They neither update their racial attitudes nor sort on these beliefs. The next column pair, however, reveals different patterns, and evidence in line with my expectations. The politically aware appear to update their racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.057$, $p < 0.05$) and adopt new party loyalties ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.165$, $p < 0.05$), with racial attitudes offering more substantive influence.²⁶ In this context, those who are likely to receive information and have the ability to respond to it appear to be more willing to switch parties than update their views of black Americans. That the politically aware change more supports my claim that individuals are likely responding to the information environment.

The results from the VOTER survey reveal different patterns. Between 2012 and 2016, the least politically aware both change their racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.123$, $p < 0.05$) and adopt new party loyalties ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.122$, $p < 0.05$). Even the least politically attuned appear willing to update their attitudes. But the results also indicate that the more politically aware are more responsive, suggesting the patterns I identify come from whites responding to the information environment. High-awareness whites' partisanship relates to changing racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.167$, $p < 0.05$), a substantively large difference that is also greater than that for low-awareness whites.²⁷ Further, while the results suggest sorting on racial attitudes ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.128$, $p < 0.05$), this is substantively less important than partisanship. Only 7 per cent of the most aware white sample place at racial resentment's poles whereas strong partisans make up 46 per cent of the sample. While the evidence suggests the most aware are more likely to change their racial attitudes, both groups appear similarly likely to adopt new party loyalties.²⁸

²⁶Even so, the difference in effects between the low- and high-awareness groups is imprecisely estimated in both instances ($\hat{\beta}_1$: $p = 0.40$ and $\hat{\alpha}_2$: $p = 0.12$, two-tailed), apparently due to the use of a truncated sophistication measure. A model moderating by the full awareness measure rather than the low-high dichotomy reveals a significant difference across the range of awareness on sorting but not attitude change.

²⁷Partisanship's larger effect is significant ($p < 0.05$). This difference persists when moderating by the full awareness measure rather than focusing on the low-high binary.

²⁸In Appendix K I show that the group affect measure offers broadly consistent results.

Table 5. Political awareness's moderating effect on the relationship between racial resentment and partisanship

	1992–1994 ANES				2012–2016 voter survey			
	Low awareness		High awareness		Low awareness		High awareness	
	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.021 (0.038)	0.774* (0.050)	0.057* (0.024)	0.879* (0.031)	0.121* (0.011)	0.786* (0.013)	0.167* (0.011)	0.808* (0.012)
Racial resentment _{t-1}	0.579* (0.061)	0.032 (0.080)	0.595* (0.034)	0.165* (0.044)	0.757* (0.017)	0.119* (0.019)	0.863* (0.014)	0.129* (0.015)
Constant	0.288* (0.044)	0.084 (0.058)	0.227* (0.023)	-0.014 (0.029)	0.087* (0.012)	0.065* (0.014)	-0.047* (0.008)	0.022* (0.008)
Observations	196	196	396	396	2,774	2,774	2,823	2,823
R ²	0.320	0.553	0.471	0.706	0.474	0.619	0.747	0.769
Residual std. error	0.171	0.226	0.151	0.193	0.199	0.223	0.146	0.151

These results support my argument that the information environment facilitates dynamics. With the politically aware the most engaged and attentive, they should be the most responsive to information they receive about race; my findings support this view.

Conclusion

I demonstrate that the relationship between partisanship and racial animus is not unidirectional as prior scholarship at least implicitly believes (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder 2013). Rather, partisanship's centrality in whites' belief systems grounds my claim that it may contribute to racial attitude changes. I offer evidence that partisanship relates to changes on two dimensions of racial attitudes, and report results that it shapes stereotyping in Appendix I. Finally, while partisans of all stripes may update their racial attitudes, the politically aware change the most.²⁹ This aligns with my claim that partisans are responding to the information environment.

My results recast our understanding of the relationship between two predispositions presumed to be fundamental to individuals. Racial attitudes arguably form early in life and persist in much the same form through adulthood (Goldman and Hopkins *forthcoming*; Henry and Sears 2009). Similarly, although partisan allegiances form somewhat later, the evidence suggests they typically shift the most following substantial changes in the party system (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002). Racial attitudes' early development and persistence encourages placing them causally prior to other outcomes, including partisanship, but this conceptualization blinds scholars to potential changes in causal dynamics. That partisanship and racial attitudes appear to have similar cognitive characteristics (Sears 1993) perhaps makes it less surprising that whites' partisan ties can motivate them to update their beliefs about black Americans in response to new information given received wisdom that similar processes motivate party switching (Green et al. 2002).

While less conclusive, patterns in the results I present suggest that variation in partisanship's importance in the relationship may come from changes in the political environment. This is possible because political contexts make some predispositions more central in belief systems than others (Highton and Kam 2011), with greater centrality increasing the predisposition's causal influence on other attitudes (Converse 1964). Evidence that racial attitudes shape party loyalties comes in large part from the 1960s–1980s, a period when many Americans were adjusting their partisanship to account for changes in the party system caused by an issue that was more important to them than their partisan ties (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Green et al. 2002; Sears and Funk 1999). But by defining conflict more in terms of partisanship than other concerns, the current polarized and competitive political environment has made partisanship a much stronger political force (Azari and Hetherington 2016). The results I report here and in the Appendix are consistent with this contextual change influencing dynamics.

By elevating partisanship over other lines of conflict, partisan biases in information seeking and processing become more likely (Henderson and Theodoridis 2018; Mason 2018), giving people few incentives to change their party loyalties and more cause to adopt party-consistent attitudes (Highton and Kam 2011). That partisanship's influence increases in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, and is typically greater than the impact of racial attitudes, is consistent with context affecting dynamics by shaping which orientation(s) people use to understand the world around them. Such context-specific dynamics are also consistent with recent work revealing that partisanship shapes religious affiliations in specific life-cycle moments (Margolis 2018). Partisanship appears to be capable of shaping presumptively fundamental orientations, but the extent of this influence may be conditional.

That whites are likely to change their racial attitudes potentially introduces perverse incentives for political campaign strategy. For decades politicians have faced the 'electoral temptations of race' to generate support through racial campaign appeals (Kinder and Sanders 1996;

²⁹While inconclusive, analyses in Appendices L and M suggest Democrats are unique in the degree of their attitude change.

Mendelberg 2001). Republican candidates may increasingly find success using this messaging because their core supporters' increasingly negative racial attitudes give these tactics greater purchase. Moreover, my results suggest such appeals could lead to additional party-driven attitude change, therefore introducing a vicious cycle. It seems unlikely that these attitude change dynamics are a short-term phenomenon.

Recent work suggests that negative racial appeals could have even more deleterious outcomes because the set of racial appeals available to politicians may be increasing. Whereas prior work demonstrated that social norms shape how politicians talk about race (Mendelberg 2001), new evidence suggests these prohibitions may be changing (Valentino et al. 2018). Whites do not appear to shun explicit racial cues like they used to. If party elites who employ negative racial appeals are not punished, then these appeals may become increasingly common. Such an outcome could produce pernicious consequences because the current party-centric era makes party elites particularly influential sources of social norms. Elites using negative racial appeals, particularly explicitly hostile ones, can validate this same behavior in the mass public (Crandall et al. 2018). Changing norms can lead the racial tensions built into the party system to surface, with normatively troubling consequences.

Conversely, my results also indicate that politics, through partisanship, may reduce racial animus. That white Democrats' attitudes are becoming more positive towards blacks suggests that political processes need not exclusively amplify racial animus. Motivation appears to be a key component of effective prejudice reduction techniques (Paluck and Green 2009), and my results suggest that partisanship may provide some of the encouragement whites need to re-evaluate racial categories. Further, that the politically aware exhibit more attitude change suggests some combination of information exposure and willingness and/or ability to update existing attitudes. Future work could consider the discrete factor(s) at work among Democrats to identify paths for mitigating racial animus.

But all of this assumes that the patterns of change I describe reflect actual attitude change. While changes in survey reports that relate to partisanship could indicate patterns of expressive responding and social desirability concerns rather than true attitude change (Bullock et al. 2015), analyses in Appendix N suggest that the meaning of racial resentment does not appreciably change over time in ways that suggest responses contain additional considerations. Attitude change, not expressive responding, appears to best explain the patterns I present. Left unaddressed, though, is how this likely attitude change relates to behavior. It could be the case that white Democrats look little different than white Republicans when considering observed inter-group behaviors despite having markedly different attitudes. This is an important question, and investigating it will help explore the potential disconnect between stated and revealed preferences.³⁰

These lessons reorient the perspective that race is fundamental to politics by demonstrating that politics are also fundamental to race. Politics shape how whites view black Americans. Despite the Founders' desires, proper institutional arrangements appear insufficient to stifle group-based antagonisms (Hamilton et al. 2006[1788]). In fact, the processes these structures establish can stoke, or quell, racial animus.

Supplementary material. Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/V7TQOZ> and online appendices are available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000437>

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³⁰I thank the reviewers for emphasizing this point.

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Online Appendix: Racial Attitudes through a Partisan Lens

Abstract

The material that follows incorporates additional information and analyses referenced in the text.

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Appendix A: Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics

Past discrimination: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”

Deserve less: “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.”

Try hard: “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” (Reverse Coded)

Special favors (Not asked in 2016 CCAP): “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” (Reverse Coded)

Special favors (2008 CCAP version): “Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors.” (Reverse Coded)

Responses in 4 of the 5 surveys are recorded on 5-point Likert-type scales anchored by strongly agree and strongly disagree. The VOTER Survey differed, with responses recorded on 4-point agree-disagree scales that also included a “don’t know” response. “Don’t knows” were recoded as midpoints on the scale to approximate the 5 category scale. Descriptive statistics for each scale in each data collection used in the main text analyses, grouped by party, are presented in Table A.1.

Table A.1: Descriptives for Racial Resentment Measures

		ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016		
Mean	Democrats	0.56	0.57	0.54	0.52	0.54	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.41	0.41	0.40
	Republicans	0.65	0.68	0.79	0.80	0.78	0.81	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.73	0.71
SD	Democrats	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.31	0.29	0.28
	Republicans	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.22
Cronbach’s α	Democrats	0.75	0.74	0.84	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.90	0.86	0.85
	Republicans	0.65	0.56	0.73	0.74	0.76	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.71	0.69

Note: Statistics come from non-Hispanic white respondents completing both waves. Weighted results.

Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses: A Polarizing Political Context Coincides with Polarizing Racial Attitudes

Here I show descriptively that the connection between whites’ racial attitudes and partisanship has strengthened considerably over the past three decades. Importantly, however, the pattern of changes in these variables indicates that partisanship should be considered as a potential causal force. First, using data from the face-to-face interviews in the 1986-2016 ANES surveys I present means for racial resentment broken down by party in Figure B.1. Between 1986 and 1990, little difference existed between Democrats and Republicans.¹ But starting in 1992 the partisan gap grows in almost every passing year. It increases to 0.07 points in 1992, hits 0.15 points in 2004, and reaches a current peak of 0.28 points in 2016. Before 2016 most of this change came from Republicans becoming increasingly racially resentful. Republicans averaged a 0.61 on the scale in 1986, and 0.70 come 2016. Between 1986 and 2012, Democrats averaged between a 0.54 and 0.57, but dropped an astonishing 0.14 points between 2012 and 2016 to 0.41.² Between 1986 and 2016, the correlation between the ANES’s 7-point partisanship measure and racial resentment strengthened from a paltry 0.06 to a robust 0.49.³




Figure B.1: Whites’ average racial resentment levels by party affiliation and the correlation between the two. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.

Not only are the means moving apart, but the distributions are changing as well. This is a critically important point. It is not that racially resentful erstwhile Democrats and racially sympathetic erstwhile Republicans have sorted themselves out of the “wrong” party, therefore

¹I include leaners with strong and weak partisans.

²Since 2008, similar partisan gaps have grown on affect and interracial dating measures (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018).

³This relationship implicates both Southern and non-Southern whites. For Southerners the correlation changes from -0.05 to 0.38. For non-Southerners it increases from 0.11 to 0.51.

increasing the correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes. Instead, partisans are moving toward the scale's extremes over time. Figure B.2 breaks down the distribution of Democrats' and Republicans' racial resentment scores, comparing when the items first appear in the American National Election Study with more recent readings. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, little substantive difference existed between partisans.⁴




Figure B.2: Racial resentment's distribution among whites by party in select years. Bars indicate proportion of party identifiers with given level of racial resentment. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.

Things change in the 2000s as Republicans increasingly move rightward. In 2004, the most resentful three categories contain 25% of Republicans, up from 16% in 1988. This increases to 28% in 2016 with 14% scoring at the measure's maximum, making it the modal category.

White Democrats' attitudes were much more stable until Barack Obama's second term in office. The substantial drop in the group's average level of racial resentment coincided with a large distributional shift. The least resentful three categories contained 8% of Democrats in 2012, but 24% come 2016. Moreover, the modal white Democrat now places at the scale's

⁴ Racial resentment's distribution does not, for instance, clearly differ by party in 1988 ($\chi^2_{16} = 25.499$, $p = 0.06$).

minimum (12%), while only 2% did in 2012. Not only are partisans' evaluations of blacks increasingly distinct, but their racial attitudes are becoming more extreme.

These changes do not accord with a story where racial attitudes are consistently more central, and thus a more likely causal force, than partisanship. In this same time period, partisanship's distribution changes little. Between 1988 and 2016, the number of whites identifying as any type of Democrat decreases by 1.5 percentage points and the percentage of white Republican identifiers increased by 5 points. Similarly, partisans are not becoming markedly more extreme. Neither party sees more than a 4 percentage point increase in strong partisans in this 28-year window. It makes little sense to consider a less stable construct (racial resentment) as consistently causally prior to a more stable one (partisanship).

Appendix C: Comparing Relative Magnitudes over Time

The main text references an omnibus model stacking the data sets together to assess whether the impact of partisanship on racial attitudes is significantly greater in the Obama era than the Clinton Era. These results are reported in Table C.1. The substantive picture is the same as the results reported in the text. What this analysis offers is insight into whether changes in the effects of partisanship and racial resentment change across data collections. As one indication, the second row compares the effect of partisanship measured in the 2008 CCAP relative to partisanship in the 1992-1994 ANES. The 6 point increase in magnitude is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Similarly, moving to the eighth row and second column, the near 8 point decrease in racial resentment's influence between data collections is not significant ($p > 0.05$).

Table C.1: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Attitudes

	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.041 (0.021)	0.853* (0.025)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2008	0.061* (0.022)	0.064* (0.025)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: March	0.034 (0.036)	0.069* (0.033)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: August	0.088* (0.036)	0.082* (0.031)
Partisanship _{t-1} *VOTER Survey 2012-2016	0.106* (0.027)	-0.061 (0.032)
Partisanship _{t-1} *CCAP 2016	0.048* (0.024)	0.066* (0.026)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.600* (0.031)	0.127* (0.041)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2008	0.139* (0.033)	-0.079 (0.041)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: March	0.211* (0.042)	-0.061 (0.049)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2012: August	0.192* (0.056)	-0.095* (0.048)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *VOTER Survey 2012-2016	0.237* (0.040)	0.014 (0.049)
Racial Resentment _{t-1} *CCAP 2016	0.191* (0.033)	-0.093* (0.042)
CCAP 2008	-0.123* (0.022)	0.001 (0.026)
CCAP 2012: March	-0.147* (0.028)	-0.014 (0.029)
CCAP 2012: August	-0.162* (0.033)	0.001 (0.032)
VOTER Survey 2012-2016	-0.242* (0.026)	0.025 (0.031)
CCAP 2016	-0.174* (0.023)	0.015 (0.019)
Constant	0.243* (0.022)	0.011 (0.025)
Observations	25,065	25,065
R ²	0.670	0.812
Residual Std. Error	0.153	0.146

Note: *p<0.05

OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models use population weights. Variables scaled 0-1. The 1992-1994 ANES is the baseline data set.

Appendix D: Standardizing Variables to Address Relative Influence

The main text analyses offer two perspectives on the relative influence for each predisposition. The first focuses on estimating the difference in theoretical maximum influence indicated by a min-max change in a predisposition by using a seemingly unrelated regression strategy. But evidence from such comparisons is limited in part due to differences in the variance of the related constructs. The second addresses the sizes of the sample these differences relate as to whether these effects are understated. Even so, some may argue these comparisons do not effectively shed light on each predisposition's relative importance. A third way to address relative influence comes from using standardized coefficients. While methodologists disagree about their utility (cf. King 1986; Luskin 1991), standardizing variables to account for each's distribution can shed light on how much variation in the outcome variable is related to variation in the explanatory variable (Luskin 1991; Gelman and Hill 2007).

Table D.1 reports the results for the main text models that operationalize racial attitudes with racial resentment after standardizing all variables and estimating the models using OLS. This procedure de-means each variable and then divides it by its standard deviation. In support of my hypothesis that partisanship should be more substantively meaningful in its relationship with racial attitudes in political contexts privileging it over other concerns, the results from all models except those from 1992-1994 ANES reveal a larger relative influence for partisanship than racial attitudes.⁵ This is additional evidence that attitude change rather than sorting best explains the dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship in party-centric political contexts.

Table D.2 extends these analyses to the differential affect measure. Again, this takes the difference between whites' feelings about blacks and their feelings about whites such that higher values denote more negative evaluations of blacks than whites. The results here again point to attitude change rather than sorting as best characterizing the more party-centric political context covered by the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. Partisanship is about 5 times as influential as racial attitudes as measured by differential group affect.

⁵In all cases but the 1992-1994 ANES and the March wave of the 2012 CCAP, partisanship's effect is reliably different than racial resentment's ($p < .05$).

Table D.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Standardized Variables

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 YOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.064 (0.034)	0.807* (0.024)	0.145* (0.009)	0.914* (0.006)	0.097* (0.037)	0.910* (0.021)	0.166* (0.038)	0.917* (0.018)	0.170* (0.009)	0.781* (0.008)	0.107* (0.012)	0.914* (0.008)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.635* (0.033)	0.081* (0.026)	0.739* (0.009)	0.033* (0.006)	0.766* (0.027)	0.048* (0.020)	0.733* (0.043)	0.023 (0.018)	0.702* (0.008)	0.101* (0.009)	0.802* (0.011)	0.028* (0.008)
Constant	0.003 (0.034)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.033 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.041 (0.032)	0.001 (0.018)	0.008 (0.008)	0.062* (0.007)	0.000 (0.010)	0.004 (0.007)
Observations	592	592	8,866	8,866	726	726	751	751	6,012	6,012	8,116	8,116
R ²	0.424	0.656	0.660	0.865	0.680	0.885	0.663	0.864	0.614	0.682	0.725	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.753	0.589	0.566	0.358	0.550	0.329	0.543	0.343	0.575	0.522	0.451	0.316

Note: OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized. Analyses use population weights. *p<0.05

Table D.2: Relationship between Partisanship and Affect Differential, Standardized Variables

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	-0.004 (0.042)	0.822* (0.023)	0.189* (0.026)	0.821* (0.018)	0.156* (0.017)	0.919* (0.008)
Affect Difference _{t-1}	0.559* (0.062)	0.016 (0.023)	0.494* (0.032)	0.034* (0.015)	0.554* (0.021)	0.030* (0.008)
Constant	0.017 (0.041)	0.001 (0.027)	0.022 (0.025)	0.063* (0.017)	0.025 (0.015)	0.004 (0.007)
Observations	577	577	5,720	5,720	8,120	8,120
R ²	0.294	0.648	0.317	0.687	0.378	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.874	0.599	0.821	0.443	0.708	0.316

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Appendix E: Addressing Measurement Error with Structural Equation Models

In the main text I note that measurement error may potentially affect my conclusions in part by influencing measure stabilities. Here, I replicate the main text analyses using structural equation models as a way to tame measurement error. To facilitate interpretation, I separately report the measurement model results, attitude stabilities, and cross-lagged effects. Finally, to make the comparison as direct as possible I focus only on the respondents included in the main text analysis. Rather than using full information maximum likelihood or some other estimation technique that allows for missingness in my model, I restrict the data to the same respondent set. I then estimate all models via maximum likelihood using the lavaan R package (version 0.5) (Rosseel 2012).

I estimate the same model for all panels. For the measurement component, I freely estimate the factor loadings for each racial resentment item, but constrain the loadings for each item to be equal at $t - 1$ and t . This fixes the meaning of racial resentment over time. To identify these latent variables I therefore set each's metric to unit variance. I also correlate the item error variances over time (e.g., past discrimination at $t - 1$ and past discrimination at t) and between items sharing the same response format (e.g., try hard and special favors are reverse coded). Because it is a single item, partisanship's metric is identified by fixing the single item loading to 1. Finally, the covariances between partisanship and racial resentment are also fixed over time. Table E.1 presents the measurement model components of the SEM results for each data set used in the main text analyses, including the factor loadings and fit indices. The fit results are adequate, although not ideal (Brown 2015).

Tables E.2 and E.3 contain the results from the structural relationships in the cross lagged SEMs. The stability estimates in Table E.2 affirm that each predisposition is highly stable, and also indicate that partisanship is more persistent. But this is not to say they do not change. The results in Table E.3 again support my argument that the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes is dynamic, and that partisanship becomes more influential in contexts privileging it above other predispositions. In only one case (December-March in the 2012 CCAP) do the substantive conclusions differ from the main text results. Here there is no evidence supporting the racial attitude influence hypothesis, with the effect imprecisely estimated ($p = .104$).

Furthermore, I can address relative magnitudes through a completely standardized solu-

Table E.1: SEM Measurement Model Results

	ANES 1992-1994	CCAP 2008	CCAP 2012: March	CCAP 2012: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	CCAP 2016
Special Favors	0.763 (0.037)	0.695 (0.008)	0.707 (0.029)	0.698 (0.025)	0.810 (0.009)	—
Deserve Less	0.386 (0.036)	0.673 (0.008)	0.597 (0.027)	0.618 (0.024)	0.719 (0.008)	0.724 (0.010)
Try Hard	0.728 (0.039)	0.716 (0.009)	0.722 (0.031)	0.703 (0.027)	0.801 (0.009)	0.933 (0.010)
Past Discrimination	0.416 (0.042)	0.764 (0.009)	0.749 (0.032)	0.711 (0.028)	0.817 (0.010)	0.844 (0.009)
Partisanship	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)	1 (—)
χ^2	172.628	4193.889	460.871	412.831	1932.661	5887.985
DF	30	28	28	28	28	15
CFI	0.932	0.933	0.923	0.933	0.960	0.900
TLI	0.898	0.893	0.877	0.893	0.936	0.812
SRMR	0.106	0.183	0.200	0.189	0.158	0.235
RMSEA [90% CI]	0.09 [0.077, 0.103]	0.13 [0.126, 0.133]	0.146 [0.134, 0.158]	0.135 [0.124, 0.147]	0.106 [0.102, 0.11]	0.22 [0.215, 0.224]
N	592	8866	726	751	6014	8116

Entries denote parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Estimated via maximum likelihood. Factor variances for racial resentment and partisanship item loading fixed to 1 to identify the model. Loadings constrained to equality over time.

Table E.2: Stability Coefficients for Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
Partisanship	0.845 (0.026)	<i>0.794</i> (0.016)	0.928 (0.005)	<i>0.908</i> (0.002)	0.941 (0.015)	<i>0.923</i> (0.007)	0.947 (0.016)	<i>0.914</i> (0.007)	0.852 (0.008)	<i>0.808</i> (0.005)	0.941 (0.005)	<i>0.915</i> (0.003)
Racial Resentment	0.790 (0.053)	<i>0.619</i> (0.026)	0.879 (0.014)	<i>0.639</i> (0.007)	0.977 (0.051)	<i>0.684</i> (0.021)	0.997 (0.047)	<i>0.684</i> (0.020)	0.986 (0.017)	<i>0.671</i> (0.008)	0.906 (0.014)	<i>0.656</i> (0.006)

Note: * $p < 0.05$

Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement results reported in Table E.1.

tion. These results, italicized entries in Tables E.2 and E.3, demonstrate that partisanship’s temporal influence consistently surpasses racial attitudes’ in this later period. Interpreted as the standard deviation change in the outcome produced by a standard deviation change in the predictor, partisanship is 2.5 to 15 times as influential as racial attitudes in the relationship. The conclusions drawn from the main text models receive additional support even after addressing potential differences in measure reliability introduced by measurement error.

Table E.3: Cross-Lagged Effects of Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.068	<i>0.017</i>	0.617*	<i>0.158*</i>	0.582*	<i>0.135*</i>	0.674*	<i>0.152*</i>	0.672*	<i>0.152*</i>	0.470*	<i>0.117*</i>
→ Racial Resentment _t	(0.143)	<i>(0.037)</i>	(0.040)	<i>(0.010)</i>	(0.154)	<i>(0.036)</i>	(0.148)	<i>(0.034)</i>	(0.051)	<i>(0.012)</i>	(0.041)	<i>(0.010)</i>
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.023*	<i>0.068*</i>	0.004*	<i>0.010*</i>	0.008	<i>0.025</i>	0.005	<i>0.014</i>	0.023*	<i>0.065*</i>	0.005*	<i>0.015*</i>
→ Partisanship _t	(0.009)	<i>(0.027)</i>	(0.002)	<i>(0.005)</i>	(0.005)	<i>(0.016)</i>	(0.005)	<i>(0.016)</i>	(0.003)	<i>(0.008)</i>	(0.002)	<i>(0.005)</i>

Note: * $p < 0.05$

Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement models reported in Table E.1.

Appendix F: Analyses Incorporating Additional Core Attitudes

To address the possibility that attitudes correlated with partisanship but omitted from my model explain my findings, I include other core predispositions into the main text models. These include culture war (Goren and Chapp 2017) and economic orientations, as well as immigration attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Unfortunately not all data sets contain measures for these orientations captured in the same wave as partisanship and racial resentment, which would cloud temporal comparisons if entered into the models. Nor are operationalizations consistent across data sets, but as best as possible my coding follows existing work (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Goren and Chapp 2017).⁶ Despite these limits my results speak to whether

⁶ The operationalizations for each measure are as follows. In the 1992-1994 ANES I operationalization culture war attitudes using the same four items as Goren and Chapp (2017). One item relates to abortion: “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose.” With responses: (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted. (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman’s life is in danger. (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Two items asking whether they “favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination” and “think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don’t you think so”, with responses recorded on four-point (strongly) agree/disagree scales. Finally, I included a feeling thermometer for “Gay men and lesbians; that is, homosexuals.” I code each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.28, $\alpha = 0.75$). For immigration opinion, I combine 5 items. The first asks “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?” The next three record responses on four point scales from extremely to not at all likely. These ask how likely is it that “the growing number of Hispanics will improve our culture with new ideas and customs,” “cause higher taxes due to more demands for public services,” and “take jobs away from people already here”. Finally, I include a feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants. I key each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.62, sd = 0.18, $\alpha = 0.65$).

In the 2008 CCAP I measure anti-immigration attitude with an item asking respondents if “Illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported as quickly as possible, regardless of their circumstances” or “Illegal immigrants now living in the U.S. should be allowed to become citizens if they pay a fine and meet other requirements.” I key this to indicate anti-immigrant opinion. I capture culture war attitudes with two items, one concerning abortion’s legality (responses: Abortion should always be legal = 0; abortion should be legal with some restrictions; abortion should only be legal in special circumstances.; abortion should be illegal. It should never be allowed = 1) and the other asking whether one supports civil unions for gay couples (responses strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I code each to capture opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.34, $\alpha = 0.71$).

In the 2012 CCAP I measure anti-immigration attitude with 3 items asking respondents if “illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain,” if “it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently” and if they “favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?” I key each to capture opposition and combine them into

it's partisanship and racial attitudes themselves, or related factors, that explain my results.

The conclusions drawn from the main text models persist even after accounting for these other presumptively fundamental predispositions. Table F.1 demonstrates that partisanship still has a substantively and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes in a party-centric era. In no case does partisanship no longer explain attitude change in the Obama era or 2016 election models. When conclusions do change they come from the effect racial attitudes have on party switching. The March reinterviews for the 2012 CCAP and the 2016 CCAP analyses each suggested that racial attitudes motivated sorting. Incorporating additional core attitudes introduces additional imprecision into the estimates, dropping the results from conventional levels of statistical significance. That all the explanatory variables are highly correlated suggests multicollinearity could explain the imprecision, but even then the substantive impact appears negligible for at least the 2016 election patterns.

a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.47, sd = 0.31, $\alpha = 0.73$). Culture war attitudes are operationalized with 3 items, one on abortion's legality (responses legal in all cases, legal/illegal in some cases, illegal in all cases), one asking whether someone favors or opposes gay marriage (responses favor or oppose), and a feeling thermometer asking about one's feelings towards gays. I code each to capture negative attitudes or opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.44, sd = 0.31, $\alpha = 0.75$). Finally, I measure economic orientations with an item asking if "there is too much or too little regulation of business by the government?" with responses recorded as too much (coded = 1), about right (0.5), or too little (0).

I use the same operationalization scheme as the 2012 CCAP for the VOTER survey, each again scaled 0-1 denoting more conservative attitudes (anti-immigration attitude: mean = 0.58, sd = 0.32, $\alpha = 0.72$; culture war attitudes: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.31, $\alpha = 0.76$).

Finally, for the 2016 CCAP I operationalize culture war attitudes with 3 items. One for whether people "have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of" gays and lesbians (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they favor or oppose "repealing a woman's right to have an abortion" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1), and "allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I then combine these items into a 0-1 scale where higher scores correspond with conservative positions (mean = 0.37, sd = 0.34, $\alpha = 0.81$). I use a similar set for anti-immigration attitudes. One item includes favorability evaluations of illegal immigrants (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they favor or oppose "building a wall along the Mexican border" (responses: strongly oppose = 0, strongly favor = 1) and "providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). Likewise, I combine these items into a 0-1 scale with higher scores denoting anti-immigrant attitudes (mean = 0.56, sd = 0.35, $\alpha = 0.83$).

Table F.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, with additional attitudes

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 YOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment _{t-1}	Partisanship _{t-1}	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.030 (0.022)	0.812* (0.028)	0.071* (0.005)	0.902* (0.005)	0.066* (0.022)	0.884* (0.017)	0.041* (0.020)	0.892* (0.018)	0.063* (0.010)	0.734* (0.010)	0.051* (0.007)	0.895* (0.006)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.558* (0.034)	0.087* (0.044)	0.689* (0.008)	0.036* (0.007)	0.707* (0.029)	0.027 (0.023)	0.744* (0.028)	-0.008 (0.026)	0.690* (0.013)	0.065* (0.014)	0.710* (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)
Anti-Immigration Attitudes _{t-1}	0.067 (0.041)	-0.022 (0.053)	0.051* (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.134* (0.022)	0.039* (0.017)	0.082* (0.021)	0.054* (0.019)	0.140* (0.010)	0.065* (0.011)	0.127* (0.008)	0.053* (0.007)
Culture War Attitudes _{t-1}	0.088* (0.028)	0.163* (0.036)	0.052* (0.006)	0.035* (0.005)	0.005 (0.023)	0.055* (0.018)	0.052* (0.022)	0.052* (0.020)	0.093* (0.010)	0.118* (0.010)	0.018* (0.007)	0.029* (0.006)
Economic Orientations _{t-1}					0.039* (0.017)	0.042* (0.013)	0.065* (0.017)	0.020 (0.015)	0.063* (0.008)	0.019* (0.007)		
Constant	0.190* (0.027)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.114* (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)	0.062* (0.016)	-0.029* (0.013)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.007)	0.009* (0.007)	0.051* (0.004)	0.020* (0.004)
Observations	521	521	8,717	8,717	652	652	669	669	5,588	5,588	7,079	7,079
R ²	0.455	0.674	0.673	0.866	0.710	0.893	0.737	0.867	0.648	0.705	0.741	0.854
Residual Std. Error	0.157	0.203	0.145	0.133	0.142	0.113	0.129	0.119	0.171	0.183	0.134	0.116

Note: *p<0.05

OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Analyses employ population weights. Variables scaled 0-1.

What's interesting, too, is the relationships between these additional attitudes and racial resentment. In all cases one or more of these orientations explains racial attitude change, but to my knowledge no extant work suggests why these relationships should exist. Most likely, as with partisanship, these attitudes motivate selection into certain information environments where, upon encountering information on race, individuals then update their attitudes to maintain belief system coherence. The interrelationships between these attitudes are interesting and other work should consider investigating them in greater detail in future work. But the point remains: my account that the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship is dynamic, with partisanship shaping racial attitudes, holds.

Appendix G: Analyses with Additional Party-Centric Era Panels

I also conducted additional analyses relating racial resentment and partisanship in other data collections to demonstrate that the effect I find for partisanship on racial attitudes does not come from the data collections used in the main text analyses or the specific time periods employed. Here, I focus on the 2006 and 2010 waves of the 2006-2008-2010 General Social Survey (GSS) panel, the 2008-2012 CCAP panel, and the 2010 and 2014 waves of the 2010-2012-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study panel.⁷ These data shed light on different parts of President Obama's tenure in office, including reactions to his seeking the Democratic Party's nomination (GSS) and reactions to his first term (CCAP). Similarly, the GSS and CCES shed light on whether presidential election years uniquely privilege partisanship in the relationship, or if lower salience midterm elections still see similar patterns.

Importantly, these panels vary in their operationalization of racial resentment. Only the CCAP contains the full four-item set. The CCES contains just two items (special favors and past discrimination) and the GSS contains a single item (special favors) to which I add other items based on prior work (Kinder and Chudy 2016, see also Tesler 2016).⁸ All analyses again focus on non-Hispanic whites.⁹

Table G.1 shows that the results from the analyses using full and truncated versions of the racial resentment measure reflect the results presented in the main text. In each model lagged partisanship has a substantive and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes ($p < 0.05$). Lagged racial resentment similarly shapes subsequent partisanship in these analyses.

Table G.2 extends these results using the GSS operationalization of racial resentment. In all instances lagged partisanship has a reliable impact of subsequent racial attitudes. And likewise for lagged racial attitudes. The consistency in results across data collections also suggests that partisanship's effect is not driven by focusing on surveys occurring in election years or non-election years.

The 2006-2010 results are particularly interesting here as they can speak most directly to how white partisans respond to an information shock—Barack Obama's candidacy and election. In this polarized political context, whites were more likely to respond to this information by aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship than shift their partisan allegiances.

Moreover, while these lagged effects not statistically distinguishable, partisanship appears the most substantively meaningful. These estimates reflect variation along the range of the measure so if cases are unevenly distributed then the estimates may overestimate the measure's influence. That similar amounts of whites place at the ends of the partisanship measure

⁷ I also considered other panels including the 2000-2004, 2004-2006, and 2008-2009-2010 ANES and the 2006-2012 Portraits of American Life Study. They unfortunately do not contain sufficient sample sizes, suitable items, or measured racial attitudes at different times temporally than partisanship which affects any analyses.

⁸ These additional items are: "On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?" and "On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty?" Responses to each were recorded as Yes/No, with disagreeing to the first and agreeing with the second coded as racially resentful responses. The last item takes the difference between respondents' ratings of whites and blacks on a 7-point scale asking them to rate each group as hardworking or lazy. This operationalization makes an adequate scale: α 2006 = 0.62 and 2010 = 0.63.

⁹The CCAP and CCES again relied on YouGov's online panel. The GSS conducted face-to-face interviews. The substantive results do not

Table G.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, CCAP and CCES Panels

	2008-2012 CCAP		2010-2014 CCES	
	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.119*	0.815*	0.112*	0.862*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.748*	0.105*	0.822*	0.101*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Constant	0.118*	0.031*	0.044*	-0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	2,204	2,204	7,238	7,238
R ²	0.642	0.770	0.671	0.831
Residual Std. Error	0.165	0.177	0.168	0.137

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Table G.2: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, GSS Panels

	2006-2010		2008-2012		2010-2014	
	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t	Racial Resentment _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.096*	0.740*	0.101*	0.784*	0.092*	0.820*
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.495*	0.120*	0.605*	0.162*	0.575*	0.116*
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Constant	0.271*	0.051*	0.200*	0.025	0.204*	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Observations	508	508	493	493	505	505
R ²	0.358	0.634	0.388	0.657	0.396	0.727
Residual Std. Error	0.182	0.198	0.191	0.195	0.186	0.173

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

makes these differences more substantively consequential in light of racial resentment's skewed distribution. Few people place at racial resentment's minimum in any data collection making the coefficient estimates speak to an unlikely comparison given the data (for a similar argument on relative effect sizes, see Goren and Chapp 2017). For example, the CCAP and CCES results indicate that 46-47% of white respondents, those identifying as strong partisans, separate by an average of 11-12 percentage points in racial resentment. In sharp contrast, while a similar difference manifests between those scoring at racial resentment's poles, this group makes up 22% of CCAP respondents and 35% in the CCES. With between a third to over twice again as many people potentially implicated in aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship, the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes appears to be better characterized by people attitude change than party switching. These conclusions are further supported by results from models using standardized variables. Similarly, including immigration and culture war attitudes does not affect the conclusions suggested by the results in Table G.1.¹⁰

¹⁰ Unfortunately the GSS's ballot assignment halves my effective sample size when including culture war attitudes, with the case loss substantially decreasing the estimates' precision. But the results are still in the expected

Appendix H: Investigating Obama's Role

Some existing work suggests President Obama was central to the connection between racial attitudes and partisan change. Specifically, those with more negative (positive) racial attitudes are more likely to evaluate Obama negatively (positively) and change their partisanship or racial attitudes accordingly (e.g., Tesler 2013, 2016). It could therefore be the case that the effects I find in the main text and supplemental analyses are solely attributable to Obama and by missing this connection my argument about partisanship's influence is incomplete. Even the 2016 CCAP analyses may feature the imprint of a two-term black president.

However, while Obama may be potentially influential as a signal of racial progress that suggests racial discrimination is over and thus motivates respondents to double down on denying discrimination, or as a positive exemplar who highlights the obstacles black Americans face, it seems unlikely that he alone explains the patterns observed. First, from a theoretical perspective these arguments suggest that his election and administration created a shock to which people reacted. This implies that attitude change or sorting should occur largely in the early Obama years as people become used to these new political realities. But if Obama alone mattered, the patterns I find during his second term or the 2016 election make less sense. That partisanship's estimated effect remains fairly consistent across models spanning different periods of Obama's time in office suggests a more general pattern. It seems a richer theoretical account emphasizes the broader information environment, and how partisanship influences interpretations of it, rather than privileging distinct stimuli. This is certainly not to say that Obama did not matter for shaping individuals' political thinking; that evidence is substantial (Tesler 2016). Rather, I modify this slightly to note that he was one piece of a larger, party-centric context that featured many potentially race-related stimuli to which people could respond (Engelhardt ND), a feature particularly characteristic of his second term. Acknowledging this provides for a richer picture of the connection between politics and race.¹¹

Second, identifying exhaustive causal mediators requires considering other factors correlated with evaluations of Obama that could explain their connection to the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes that encourages changing one or the other. This is not to say that considering possible attitudinal mechanisms connecting partisanship and racial attitudes is not important. It is by providing insight into why these relationships exist. Rather, analyses can suggest possible paths for influence and then incorporate how sensitive these paths are to unaccounted for factors that violate assumptions required to claim the proposed mediator exhausts possible mechanisms (see Imai et al. 2011; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016). Obama evaluations may matter, but they matter alongside other potentially unmeasured factors.

To demonstrate, the panels in Figure H.1 provide the estimates and confidence intervals for a mediation analysis following the Baron-Kenny regression procedure (Baron and Kenny 1986)

direction for each model in all data sets.

¹¹ Indeed, the descriptive patterns presented in the main text indicate that the largest polarization in racial attitudes came during President Obama's second term. If Obama alone mattered for this shift it seems like this change should have happened during his first term in office. But this latter period saw the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and increased attention to police brutality and the persistence of racial discrimination, as well as Donald Trump's presidential campaign. These movements, and the media attention they generated, offered information to which partisans could, and seemingly did, respond.

using the 2008-2012 CCAP and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey.¹² The total effect result corresponds with the regression results reported above and in the main text (e.g., $\text{partisanship}_{t-1}$ on $\text{racial attitudes}_t$). The average direct effect (ADE) results denote the estimated cross-lagged effect for partisanship or racial attitudes after incorporating evaluations of Barack Obama.¹³ Finally, the average causal mediation effect (ACME) signifies the portion of the relationship between partisanship or racial attitudes and the other outcome mediated by Obama evaluations.

Comparing the total effects with the ACME offers evidence for the mediating influence of Obama evaluations. Figure H.1 shows that whites' feelings about Obama help explain the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. But they are not the whole story. Lagged partisanship and racial attitudes still have statistically and substantively significant direct influences on the respective outcome, evidence indicating that other mechanisms are at work.




Figure H.1: Point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the average total effect, average causal mediation effect (ACME), and average direct effect (ADE).

These results, however, are only part of the account. The panels in Figure H.2 contain results from sensitivity analyses for the preceding outcomes. They speak to how much the ACME changes given levels of confounding by unobservables. The approach relates the proportion of variation in the mediator (Obama evaluations) and the outcome (racial attitudes or partisanship) explained by the confounder to the estimated ACME (Imai et al. 2011). Specifically, I hypothesize unobserved confounding to affect the mediator and outcome in opposite ways (e.g., more positive Obama evaluations produce less resentful attitudes).

¹² Mediation and sensitivity analysis results calculated using the `mediation` R package (version 4.4.5) (Tingley et al. 2014) which follows Imai et al. (2011). Other approaches yield similar outcomes (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016).

¹³ This item asks how favorable one feels toward Barack Obama, with responses recorded on 4-point scales ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable. I scale this to run 0-1 with higher values denoting more positive evaluations. Each are asked at $t - 1$.




Figure H.2: Sensitivity analyses for mediation results presented in Figure H.1.

At first glance these results suggest robustly estimated mediation effects for Obama evaluations. The bounds for unexplained variance (e.g., variation suggesting possible confounding as indicated by the limits of the contour lines) are relatively low, a trait Imai and colleagues (2011) note “indicates a more robust estimate of the ACME because there is less room for an unobserved confounder to bias the result” (777). Yet closer inspection reveals greater sensitivity. Relatively low levels of confounding actually switch the sign for the ACME. The top two panels, for example, indicate that if one or more unobserved variables explain over 10% of Obama evaluations and over 5% of racial attitudes or partisanship, then the ACMEs reported in Figure H.1 are incorrect. More generally, even small amounts of original variance explained

by confounders results in ACME estimates of 0 (from 0.2% to 0.5% depending on the model). How people evaluate Barack Obama may facilitate the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship, but theoretical expectations and these results suggest there's much more to the story. Exploring possible mechanisms is certainly worth other work considering.

Appendix I: Alternative Operationalizations of Racial Attitudes

I report here additional analyses using alternative measures for racial attitudes. The first addresses racial group stereotypes. The 2006-08-10 General Social Survey (GSS) panel survey includes four items asking respondents if they thought whites and blacks “tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy” and “tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent,” with responses recorded on 7-point scales. Similarly, the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES)’s online panel asked respondents if whites and blacks “in general” are hardworking or lazy, trustworthy or untrustworthy, and intelligent or unintelligent, with responses recorded on 0-100 scales.¹⁴ As with the group favorability items I take the difference between whites’ ratings of blacks and their ratings of whites to create 0-1 measures of endorsing anti-black stereotypes. I focus on the 2006-2010 waves for the GSS and waves 3 and 5 for the NAES (summer and winter 2008 respectively).¹⁵ Again, all observations come from non-Hispanic whites and given the GSS’s face-to-face interviews I focus only on those interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer in both 2006 and 2010.¹⁶

The first four columns in Table I.1 contain the results using stereotypes. They provide inconsistent evidence for a dynamic relationship between partisanship and group characterizations. Rather, the results offer more consistent evidence for the partisanship influence hypothesis. First, the GSS analyses demonstrate that partisanship does have a meaningful cross-lagged effect. Between 2006 and 2010 whites’ partisan ties motivate them to modify how much they negatively stereotype black Americans relative to white Americans ($\beta_1 = 0.025, p < 0.05$). At the same time, there’s no evidence that stereotypes motivated sorting in this period. Second, the NAES results similarly support partisanship as a causal force ($\beta_1 = 0.034, p < 0.05$). But here, evidence also supports those holding negative stereotypes of black Americans in summer 2008 diverging in their partisanship ($\alpha_2 = 0.107, p < 0.05$). While racial attitudes appear more influential here, this difference is quite overstated because it applies to the full range of the stereotype measure, a range anchored by under 1% of respondents. Racial attitudes implicates many fewer respondents than the 34% of whites identifying as strong partisans. Furthermore, results from models using standardized variables suggest that partisanship is twice as influential.

Finally, the fifth and sixth columns in Table I.1 address beliefs about interracial marriage. This item is frequently used to capture old fashion racism, a preference for social distance based on race (Tesler 2013).¹⁷ The results indicate that no dynamic relationship appears to exist between partisanship and in-marriage preference. Opposing interracial marriage is related to

¹⁴ The NAES sample came from Knowledge Networks’s Knowledge Panel with participants recruited by random-digit telephone dialing. If households lacked internet access they were provided it to participate in the panel. Unfortunately the NAES lacks any measure approximating racial resentment to which I can compare effects across racial attitude measures using the same respondents.

¹⁵ GSS₀₆: mean = 0.55, sd = 0.08. GSS₁₀: mean = 0.54, sd = 0.08. NAES_{wave3}: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.09. NAES_{wave5}: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.08.

¹⁶ After model diagnostics suggested misspecification (King and Roberts 2017), I transformed the NAES stereotype measure using a Box-Cox transformation to normalize each variable.

¹⁷ Specifically, this takes two items asking “How about having a close relative or family member marry a black/white person? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?” It’s coded such that 1 = strongly opposing someone marrying a black person and strongly favoring marrying a white person, and 0 = no in-marriage preference.

Table I.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Attitudes

	GSS 2006-2010		2008 NAES (July-December)		GSS 2006-2010	
	Anti-Black Stereotypes _t	Partisanship _t	Anti-Black Stereotypes _t	Partisanship _t	Same-Race Marriage Preference _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.025* (0.012)	0.776* (0.034)	0.034* (0.007)	0.898* (0.009)	0.026 (0.022)	0.762* (0.034)
Anti-Black Stereotypes _{t-1}	0.309* (0.050)	0.078 (0.141)	0.415* (0.018)	0.107* (0.022)		
Same-Race Marriage Preference _{t-1}					0.584* (0.038)	0.143* (0.059)
Constant	0.357* (0.027)	0.067 (0.077)	-0.377* (0.012)	0.118* (0.015)	0.232* (0.027)	0.026 (0.042)
Observations	364	364	2,938	2,938	378	378
R ²	0.113	0.598	0.164	0.787	0.395	0.591
Residual Std. Error	0.073	0.206	0.022	0.146	0.137	0.208

Note: * $p < 0.05$. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

party switching ($p < 0.05$), but partisanship has no relationship to in-marriage preferences.

Considered alongside the analyses from the main text, these results suggest that partisanship's influence on racial attitudes is not isolated to racial resentment or general group evaluations. It also shapes stereotypes. It does not, however, affect same-race marriage preferences. This mix of relationships appears to reflect patterns in the elite information environment where messages frequently relate to the themes of racial resentment (Haney López 2014; Engelhardt ND), occasionally implicate racial stereotypes (Dixon 2017), and do not appear to speak to old fashioned racist beliefs. That partisanship shapes multiple dimensions of racial animus (Kinder 2013) speaks to its influence in a party-centric political context.

I also consider here the subcomponents of the racial affect measure employed in the text. Jardina (2019) proposes that feeling thermometers can in part include ingroup affinity. Consequently, the differenced affect measure I employ includes both ingroup love and outgroup hate. Changes in ingroup favorability may then masquerade as outgroup animus according to the current metric if feelings about whites have some political origins but attitudes about blacks do not.

Tables I.2 and I.3 look at the relationship between partisanship and their feelings about whites and blacks, respectively. I reverse code the black favorability item so it runs in the direction of my hypotheses. As with the differenced affect measure, the estimates reveal no dynamic relationship between partisanship and group affect in the 1992-1994 ANES, a pattern that remains unchanged when not restricting the observations to those where the race of interviewer did not change across waves.

This changes in the 2000s data collections. I focus first on the results for white affect. The results in both the VOTER Survey and the 2016 CCAP support both the partisanship influence hypothesis and the racial attitude influence hypothesis accounts. White partisans' feelings about their racial ingroup increasingly polarize by party, with differences between 0.072 and 0.104 points on wave 2 favorability ratings ($p < 0.05$). Whites' ingroup feelings also motivate them to switch parties, but this appears more influential between December 2011 and December 2016 (0.056) than within the 2016 election itself (0.038). Finally, in both cases partisanship's influence is larger than white affect's, suggesting that attitude more than party

Table I.2: Relationship between Partisanship and White Affect

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	White Affect	Partisanship	White Affect	Partisanship	White Affect	Partisanship
Partisanship _{t-1}	0.011 (0.020)	0.869* (0.027)	0.072* (0.007)	0.834* (0.008)	0.104* (0.007)	0.928* (0.004)
White Affect _{t-1}	0.401* (0.035)	0.021 (0.046)	0.425* (0.014)	0.056* (0.014)	0.412* (0.011)	0.038* (0.006)
Constant	0.410* (0.028)	0.066 (0.037)	0.382* (0.011)	0.061* (0.012)	0.379* (0.009)	0.011 (0.006)
Observations	577	577	5,722	5,722	8,120	8,120
R ²	0.188	0.648	0.165	0.686	0.186	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.209	0.181	0.189	0.196	0.118

Note:*p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Table I.3: Relationship between Partisanship and Negative Black Affect

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	Negative Black Affect	Partisanship	Negative Black Affect	Partisanship	Negative Black Affect	Partisanship
Partisanship _{t-1}	-0.016 (0.022)	0.868* (0.027)	0.074* (0.008)	0.836* (0.008)	0.058* (0.008)	0.929* (0.004)
Negative Black Affect _{t-1}	0.565* (0.040)	0.011 (0.048)	0.490* (0.012)	0.023* (0.011)	0.552* (0.009)	0.021* (0.005)
Constant	0.189* (0.019)	0.078* (0.024)	0.118* (0.006)	0.096* (0.006)	0.114* (0.005)	0.034* (0.003)
Observations	577	577	5,722	5,722	8,120	8,120
R ²	0.261	0.648	0.243	0.686	0.352	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.172	0.209	0.201	0.189	0.212	0.118

Note:*p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

switching does more to explain changes in the correlation here.¹⁸

The estimates in Table I.3 offer a similar picture. A dynamic relationship exists between negative attitudes about blacks and whites' partisanship in both the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. Further, the estimates again suggest partisanship is relatively more influential than racial attitudes.¹⁹

Further, comparing across affect measures, the relationship between group ratings and partisanship does not seem to consistently favor partisanship's effects as asymmetrically influencing ingroup or outgroup evaluations. In 2016 partisanship's effect on white affect is nearly twice its effect on black affect, which is suggestive of partisans responding to the political context. Accounts of the 2016 election suggest a rise of white identity politics (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018), with available information potentially contributing to attitudes about outgroups, as I argue is possible, and also possible altering ingroup commitment (Jardina 2019).

¹⁸The differences in coefficient estimates presented in Table I.2 is only reliable in the CCAP data. When using standardized variables the differences increase, with partisanship's relationship with white affect measured later yielding a larger relationship.

¹⁹As with the results for evaluations of whites, the differences in coefficient estimates are more reliably estimated in the CCAP data. The VOTER survey approaches significance ($p < 0.07$, one-tailed). Standardizing the variables, however, magnifies the differences between each, with partisanship's influence greater than negative black affect.

Appendix J: Alternative Operationalization of Partisanship

In two data sets I generate substitute measures of partisanship employing differenced feeling thermometers. This new measure offers additional variation, potentially overcoming limitations from using the traditional 7-point branched ANES measure. Higher values on the outcome denote greater relative favorability for Republicans over Democrats, mirroring in part an attachment to the Republican Party. The results in Table J.1 below demonstrates that this alternative measure of partisanship still shapes racial attitudes.

Table J.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment. Alternative Partisanship Operationalization.

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment _t	Relative Republican Favorability _t	Racial Resentment _t	Relative Republican Favorability _t
Relative Republican Favorability _{t-1}	0.112* (0.037)	0.713* (0.030)	0.110* (0.006)	0.810* (0.007)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.596* (0.030)	0.108* (0.024)	0.777* (0.007)	0.107* (0.007)
Constant	0.210* (0.024)	0.116* (0.020)	0.065* (0.004)	0.052* (0.004)
Observations	574	574	8,116	8,116
R ²	0.436	0.534	0.727	0.732
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.127	0.138	0.148

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses employ population weights.

Appendix K: Examining Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect Using Group Affect

Table K.1: Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Affect Differential

	1992-1994 ANES				2012-2016 VOTER Survey			
	Low Awareness		High Awareness		Low Awareness		High Awareness	
	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t	Affect Difference _t	Partisanship _t
Partisanship _{t-1}	-0.017 (0.022)	0.774* (0.051)	0.018 (0.012)	0.909* (0.031)	0.056* (0.007)	0.800* (0.012)	0.085* (0.006)	0.878* (0.009)
Affect Difference _{t-1}	0.739* (0.070)	0.035 (0.158)	0.469* (0.043)	0.060 (0.108)	0.515* (0.018)	0.159* (0.034)	0.618* (0.019)	-0.032 (0.030)
Constant	0.176* (0.041)	0.087 (0.094)	0.270* (0.024)	0.039 (0.060)	0.230* (0.011)	0.045* (0.021)	0.132* (0.011)	0.078* (0.016)
Observations	194	194	383	383	2,573	2,573	2,689	2,689
R ²	0.377	0.551	0.249	0.693	0.266	0.625	0.368	0.775
Residual Std. Error	0.100	0.226	0.079	0.199	0.115	0.219	0.096	0.148

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

The results in Table K.1 replicate the main text analysis exploring political awareness’s conditioning role but using the affect operationalization for racial attitudes. The results offer similar insights. As with the main results using this operationalization, little dynamic relationship exists between partisanship and racial attitudes in the 1990s, and this holds for both the most and least aware (again defined here as those scoring at or above, or below, the median of political awareness in each data set).

The remaining columns reinforce the main text conclusions that changes in the political context can make partisanship a causal force and that this appears to come from people responding to the information environment. The results again show that partisanship motivates attitude change, but the politically aware change the most. The main text results extend to an additional dimension of racial animus. Where things do change is in racial attitudes’ effect on party switching. Here, the least politically aware were the most likely to adopt new party loyalties to fit with their racial attitudes. The more negatively they felt about blacks relative to whites, the more they identified as Republicans ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.159$, $p < 0.05$). The results do not offer any evidence that the most aware switched parties between 2012 and 2016 ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.032$, $p > 0.1$). This divergence across dimensions suggests that group affect may be more readily mapped on to the political system for the less politically aware.

Appendix L: Replicating the Main Analyses with an Alternative Analytic Strategy

An additional procedure for evaluating causal patterns comes from Miller (1999). This method classifies individuals based on whether they are located consistently on predisposition measures across survey waves, or whether one or both predispositions of interest change over time. From there, causal patterns can be identified by looking at the percentage of individuals who change one predisposition to align with its partner in a proposed relationship. The distribution of cases among these categories helps shed light on plausible patterns of causation, and suggests the dominant causal direction in a given time period. Here, I look at the percentage of individuals who remain at the same level of partisanship and change their racial attitudes in a congruent direction (e.g., more racially sympathetic for Democrats) and the percentage of individuals at the same level of racial resentment (reduced here to a 6-category scale to address potential measurement error issues) who change their party attachments in a congruent direction (e.g., more Republican for racially resentful individuals).²⁰ When added together these cases provide the total percentage of respondents available for identifying a causal relationship, and they can be used to explore the more influential part of a predisposition (e.g., more Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats).

The results from this exercise, reported in Table L.1, reinforce the conclusions from the cross-lagged analyses that partisanship exerts a causal force on racial attitudes, and that this influence is relatively greater in recent years when compared to the 1990s. First, in the 1992-1994 ANES data, some 28% of cases allow for determining whether partisanship or racial resentment is a causal force. Within this set, half of these causal cases support partisanship, while the other half support racial attitudes. Further, Republicans become more racially resentful at a rate slightly greater than Democrats become more racially sympathetic (rate = 1.19:1). Racially resentful individuals, those scoring above the scale's midpoint, are also twice as likely to become more attached to the Republican Party than racially sympathetic individuals decrease their attachments to the same (1.96:1).²¹ This procedure therefore helps shed light on where most of the causal action is occurring in the 1990s by revealing that more change occurs among Republicans and the racially resentful.

Turning to the 2008 election and the CCAP data, much the same pattern holds. Between March and October, some 23% of cases can identify causal patterns. In contrast to the 1990s, though, party loyalties matter much more than racial attitudes. Over three times as many whites bring their racial attitudes into alignment with their partisan ties than vice versa (3.6:1). Of these cases where causal leverage can be attributed to partisanship, Democrats are moderately more likely than Republicans to change their racial attitudes (1.25:1). Racially resentful whites are also twice as likely to express greater identification with the Republican Party than their racially sympathetic counterparts do with the Democratic Party (2:1). Like the 1992-1994

²⁰ Changing the number of categories does shape the picture presented, but do not change the substantive results. Analyses using fewer categories make racial attitudes seem more stable, but still present a substantively similar picture as those presented here. More categories do much more to privilege partisanship in the relationship. By focusing on fewer categories I present a more stringent test of my hypotheses, and still observe the proposed relationship.

²¹ Changes in party attachments can include reducing one's attachment to the same party (e.g., strong to weak Republican) or switching to another category entirely (e.g., pure independent to lean Republican).

Table L.1: Distribution of Cases featuring Partisanship or Racial Attitudes as a Plausible Cause

Causal Forces		1992-1994 ANES	2008 CCAP	2012 CCAP: March	2012 CCAP: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	2016 CCAP
Partisanship Updating Racial Attitudes	Democrats	6%	10%	9%	10%	13%	8%
	Republicans	8%	8%	9%	9%	8%	8%
	Total	14%	18%	18%	19%	21%	16%
Racial Attitudes Updating Partisanship	Racially Resentful	9%	4%	3%	4%	6%	3%
	Racially Sympathetic	5%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%
	Total	14%	5%	4%	6%	8%	5%
Causal total		28%	23%	22%	25%	29%	22%

ANES results, those with more negative racial attitudes provide more of the causal force. But in contrast to these results, partisanship causes a greater share of predisposition change than do racial attitudes, and among these cases Democrats appear more influential.

These patterns are remarkably similar when moving to the 2012 CCAP. For the March reinterviews, 22% of cases allow for plausibly identifying racial attitudes or partisanship as a cause and partisanship matters much more. This increases to 25% for the August group. For both sets of respondents, about four times as many whites update their racial attitudes as alter their partisan allegiances. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats are about equally likely to change their attitudes. When considering those updating their partisan ties, the racially resentful are more likely to weaken their attachments to, or abandon, the Democratic Party than the racially sympathetic are to change their loyalties to the Democratic Party. But this is more common among the March reinterview group than the August pool.

These trends persist when looking at changes between 2012 and 2016. Some 29% of cases can be used to identify causal patterns, and 72% of these speak to partisanship's influence. Some 21% of respondents align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, and these patterns favor Democrats. Only 8% of cases support racial attitudes having any influence. But of these, the racially resentful are thrice as likely as the racially sympathetic to modify their party loyalties to fit with their racial attitudes.

Finally, the 2016 CCAP data extend these patterns. Some 22% of cases allow for identifying causal patterns, and over three-fourths of these implicate partisanship. Within this group, partisans are indistinguishable. And again, the racially resentful are slightly more likely to change their party loyalties than are the racially sympathetic (1.5:1).

Using a different analytical strategy I again demonstrate that partisanship can change racial attitudes, and that this is more likely in a party-centric political context. What's more, this procedure also sheds light on who is most likely to update their racial attitudes or their partisanship. No partisan group seems especially prone to updating their attitudes, but if anything Democrats are unique. But racially resentful individuals are somewhat more likely to align their party loyalties appropriately than racially sympathetic individuals are to update theirs.

Table M.1: Average Levels of Racial Resentment by Party for Consistent Partisans

	CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012			VSG 2012-2016		CCAP 2016		
	March	October	December - March	December - August	2012	2016	June	Nov-Dec		
Democrats	0.53	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.55	0.53	0.50	0.41	0.40	0.39
Republicans	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.82	0.76	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.73	0.72

Note: Non-Hispanic white respondents completing both waves and not changing parties. Weighted results.

Appendix M: Party Differences in Attitude Change

Here I report additional results speaking to the possibility of differential attitude change. Table L.1 showed that observations where partisanship is a plausible cause do not disproportionately favor either party. Table M.1 provides average levels of racial resentment by party for Whites whose partisanship does not change across time. Strength of attachment can change between leaning, weak, or strong partisans so long as the category itself remains consistent. They offer mixed evidence for whether Democrats or Republicans are changing more as this varies over time. Between 2008 and 2012, Whites in both parties change to largely similar degrees. But after 2012, Democrats exhibit much more change than Republicans. Paired with the evidence from Table L.1, it may be that while the number of Republicans and Democrats changing attitudes is similar, Democrats who did change their attitudes did so to a greater degree.

I also assess changes using linear models. I relate wave 2 racial attitudes to wave 1 partisanship, but here I use the 3 category version used to provide group means. To assess relative magnitudes of change I use pure Independents as a comparison category. Such comparisons may be imprecise if Independents trend with either Democrats or Republicans. If so, then estimates about whether Democrats or Republicans are changing more will be muddled because the reference category changes concurrently. Even so, as less politically engaged individuals Independents' racial attitudes are likely least susceptible to change in the way I argue is possible. Further, if partisans are responding to the information environment, then using Independents as a baseline seems reasonable because their attitudes potentially relate more directly to a baseline information stream. If Democrats' attitudes diverge more than Republicans, then novel information may disproportionately emphasize structural barriers to black success and positive information about the group. If Republicans' attitudes diverge more, then their information stream disproportionately features negative information about blacks. At the very least these analyses speak to whether Democrats' or Republicans' subsequent racial attitudes are unique relative Independents'.

I present the results from these analyses in Table M.2. The estimates consistently point to Democrats as the most distinct group. In all cases Democrats' and Republicans' subsequent racial attitudes are distinguishable from one another ($p < 0.05$). Relative to Independents, Democrats are also unique in each data collection but the 1992-1994 ANES. Average differences here range between -0.046 and -0.099 points. Republicans, in contrast, only diverge from Independents in 3 data collections, with differences between 0.020 and 0.041 points. This evidence suggests that both Democrats' and Republicans' attitudes are changing. Further, if asymmetries in change exist, the evidence presented here suggests it may be Democrats driving this more than Republicans.

Table M.2: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994	CCAP 2008	CCAP 2012: March	CCAP 2012: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	CCAP 2016
Democrat _{t-1}	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.063* (0.006)	-0.060* (0.018)	-0.099* (0.022)	-0.082* (0.007)	-0.046* (0.005)
Republican _{t-1}	0.006 (0.022)	0.020* (0.006)	0.009 (0.018)	0.007 (0.021)	0.041* (0.007)	0.022* (0.004)
Racial Resentment _{t-1}	0.594* (0.030)	0.735* (0.007)	0.805* (0.026)	0.775* (0.025)	0.825* (0.011)	0.787* (0.007)
Constant	0.277* (0.028)	0.193* (0.007)	0.162* (0.022)	0.198* (0.026)	0.098* (0.010)	0.124* (0.005)
Observations	592	8,866	693	721	6,014	8,116
R ²	0.426	0.661	0.689	0.676	0.617	0.725
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.147	0.147	0.143	0.178	0.138

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Pure Independents are the reference category.

Appendix N: Measurement Invariance of Racial Resentment

It could be the case that comparing the 1990s and the 2000s is complicated by changes in the political context separate from partisanship’s increased relevance. Importantly, changes may introduce social desirability pressures which affect how people report their racial attitudes. Responses to the racial resentment items, for instance, may now contain both racial resentment the attitude but also presentational concerns. These additional considerations then affect the relationship between observed partisanship and racial attitudes.

One piece of evidence suggests that how attitudes are expressed does not appear to be changing in ways that affect observed relationships. The results from the General Social Survey panel presented in Table G.2 are consistent with my claim that changes in political context allow for partisanship to shape racial attitudes, albeit with a different operationalization of racial resentment. Further, the GSS conducted face-to-face interviews, removing the possibility that changes in the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship over time conflate changes in mode with changes in political context.

To offer a more direct test, if changes in political context introduced new social desirability concerns, then responses to face-to-face surveys should look different from responses completed online in the latter time period. To test this I use the 2016 ANES which used a similar sampling frame to select respondents to its web and face-to-face surveys which allows for as similar as possible mode comparison without explicit random assignment of participants to mode. With these data I use a confirmatory factor analysis procedure which assesses changes in model fit between three nested models (Brown 2015; Wicherts and Dolan 2010, see Davidov 2009 and Pérez and Hetherington 2014 for political science applications of this approach). The first model estimates a factor model for racial resentment allowing all parameters to vary by mode. This tests configural invariance which requires all four racial resentment items capture the same dimension. The second constrains each item’s factor loading to be the same by mode. This tests metric invariance and establishes whether the factors have the same meaning. If this second model fits worse than the first model, then racial resentment’s meaning varies by mode. The final model constrains item intercepts to equality across groups. If this third model fits worse than the second model, then group-specific factor(s) are affecting item responses (Wicherts and Dolan 2010), for instance social desirability pressures.

Conventionally, a significant change in χ^2 values between sequential models is used as evidence against invariance (Brown 2015). But most recommendations recommend evaluating

Table N.1: Measurement Invariance of Racial Resentment by Mode

	χ^2	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	$\Delta\chi^2$ p-value	Δ CFI	Δ SRMR	Δ RMSEA
Configural	1.53	1.000	0.001	0.000					
Metric	15.2	0.998	0.022	0.039	13.7	<0.01	-0.002	0.021	0.039
Scalar	31.5	0.995	0.030	0.047	16.3	<0.01	-0.003	0.008	0.008
Scalar (Partial)	19.8	0.997	0.028	0.037	4.64	<0.10	-0.001	0.006	-0.002

Note: The configural model freely estimates item loadings using the *deserve less* item to define the dimensions. The metric model constrains item loadings to equality. The scalar model constrains item intercepts. The scalar (partial) model frees the intercept for *past discrimination*. Data from the 2016 ANES. One residual correlation estimated between *try hard* and *special favors*.

multiple measures of model fit (Chen 2007). Consequently, I look at changes in χ^2 as well as changes in the comparative fit index (CFI), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).

I present the model fit estimates in Table N.1. They offer no evidence that racial resentment’s meaning varies by mode, suggesting whites’ responses to the racial resentment items are not contaminated by social desirability concerns. While there is a significant change in χ^2 imposing the factor equality constraints, the patterns of change in the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA do not suggest violations of measure invariance (Chen 2007). The change in CFI of -0.002 is below the recommended level of -0.005. By not passing Chen’s (2007) first condition, that the change in the RMSEA of 0.039 does surpass the 0.010 recommended does not suggest an invariance violation. RMSEA is sensitive to sample size and the change in the SRMR is below the recommended level of 0.025 (Chen 2007).

The test of scalar invariance, which speaks to the potential for social desirability concerns shaping how whites respond to the racial resentment items, offers a similar picture. While a significant change in χ^2 exists when imposing the intercept equality constraints, the changes in CFI and RMSEA do not suggest a meaningful change in model fit. Here suggested benchmarks are -0.005 for the CFI and either 0.010 for the RMSEA or 0.005 for the SRMR (Chen 2007).

To address any additional concerns with declines in fit for this test, I also offer evidence that the racial resentment measure meets partial scalar invariance by mode. This minimum standard establishes construct comparability across groups with at least one item in addition to the anchor item constrained to equality across groups (Byrne, Shavelson and Muthen 1989; Brown 2015). The final row in Table N.1 allows the intercept for *past discrimination* to vary by mode and doing so produces a model whose fit is not reliably different from the metric model.

This evidence thus does not suggest social desirability or similar concerns appreciably affect how whites respond to the racial resentment items. The meaning of the racial resentment items does not vary by mode, nor do these groups bring to bear additional considerations when responding to the items. In the context of the present analyses, changes in the relationship between partisanship and racial resentment appear to relate more to changes in attitudes rather than changes in how these attitudes are expressed.²²

An additional test considers face-to-face interviews in the ANES but compares responses across years. If social desirability concerns shape how whites express their racial attitudes,

²²Additional analyses offer no evidence that partisans are differentially affected. Comparing mode effects within party yields at least partial scalar invariance freeing the intercepts for *past discrimination* for Republicans or *special favors* for Democrats.

Table N.2: Measurement Invariance of Racial Resentment Over Time

	χ^2	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	$\Delta\chi^2$ p-value	Δ CFI	Δ SRMR	Δ RMSEA
Configural	3.81	0.999	0.005	0.027					
Metric	8.56	0.999	0.019	0.024	4.74	>0.10	-0.001	0.014	-0.003
Scalar	119.90	0.962	0.055	0.107	111.34	<0.001	-0.037	0.036	0.083
Scalar (Partial)	11.66	0.998	0.021	0.028	3.10	<0.08	-0.001	0.002	0.004

Note: The configural model freely estimates item loadings using the *past discrimination* item to define the dimensions. The metric model constrains item loadings to equality. The scalar model constrains item intercepts. The scalar (partial) model frees the intercepts for *try hard* and *special favors*. Data from the 1992 and 2016 ANES. One residual correlation estimated between *try hard* and *special favors*.

then this should introduce error into the measures comparing the 1990s and 2000s. To test this, I use data from the 1992 and 2016 ANES surveys, focusing on face-to-face interviews. The test remains the same as with the mode analysis.

The model fit estimates, presented in Table N.2 offer no evidence that racial resentment’s meaning varies across surveys. As with the mode analyses, while there is a significant change in χ^2 imposing the factor equality constraints, the patterns of change in the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA do not suggest invariance (Chen 2007). Neither the CFI, SRMR, or RMSEA display changes that pass benchmarks suggesting the items violate the equality of meaning requirement.

The first test of scalar invariance is not satisfied, however. There is a significant change in χ^2 as well as changes in the CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA that surpass suggested benchmarks. This suggests that some unobserved factor that differs between respondents in 1992 and 2016 is affecting responses to the items. But the racial resentment items meet partial scalar invariance by freely estimating *special favors* and *try hard*, as the fourth row shows. This is a sufficient condition for comparing the measure temporally without concern that additional considerations like social desirability concerns are shaping responses (Byrne, Shavelson and Muthen 1989; Brown 2015).²³

²³Looking only at Democrats or Republicans yields the same pattern: partial scalar invariance by freeing *special favors* and *try hard*.

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